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1. With apologies to Edward Bulwer-Lyon:
True, This!-
Beneath the rule of men entirely great
The pen is mightier than the sword. Behold
The arch-enchanter's wand!-itself is nothing!-
But taking sorcery from the master-hand
To paralyse the Caesars, and to strike
The loud earth breathless!-Take away the sword-
States can be saved without it!
EDWARD BULWER-LYON, RICHELIEU: OR THE CONSPIRACY act 2, sc. 2 (1839), reprinted in I NEW
YORK DRAMA: A CHOICE COLLECTION OF TRAGEDIES, COMEDIES, AND FARCES, ETC. (1876).
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"The right of belligerents to exercise full control over news transmitted
from the seat of war is one which neither we nor, we imagine, our readers
desire to call into question. In time of war military considerations must take
precedence over the legitimate claim of the public to be informed . . . ...
-London Times Editorial Board, 19042
"As in every war zone, reporting by journalists-and human rights
monitors as well-can discourage abuse and is essential to full public
understanding of the conflict." -New York Times Editorial Board, 20083
INTRODUCTION
Barrels of ink have been spilled on the discussion about how to better
protect journalists working in warzones. 4 Understandably so; throughout the
world, journalists covering armed conflicts have been harassed, threatened,
denied access, and even killed. Scholars have written on the issue of how
international humanitarian law (IHL)-the legal framework governing
warfare-can better protect journalists and have put forth important and
welcome suggestions. In doing so, they have documented the expansion of
legal protections for wartime journalists. However, few have closely
interrogated the underlying question of why IHL protections for journalists
have expanded.
This Note fills that gap. It documents a shift in international public
discourse about the role of wartime journalists and why they warrant
protection. It suggests that there are two reasons underlying IHL protection of
2. London Times Replies to Russia's Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1904 (quoting a London
Times editorial).
3. Editorial, Incursion into Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01
/06/opinion/06tuel.html.
4. See, e.g., NINA BURRI, BRAVERY OR BRAVADO?: THE PROTECTION OF NEWS PROVIDERS
IN ARMED CONFLICT (2015); Alexandre Balguy-Gallois, The Protection ofJournalists and News Media
Personnel in Armed Conflict, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 37 (2004); Kayt Davies & Emily Crawford,
Legal Avenues for Ending Impunity for the Death of Journalists in Conflict Zones: Current and
Proposed International Agreements, 7 INT'L J. OF COMM. 2157 (2013); Isabel Dilsterhaft, The
Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflicts: How Can They Be Better Safeguarded?, 29 MERKOURIOS
4 (2013); Freya Foster, The Price of News from the Front Line: Rethinking the Protection of Media
Personnel under International Humanitarian Law, 20 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 451 (2015); Christof
Heyns & Sharath Srinivasan, Protecting the Right to Life of Journalists: The Need for a Higher Level of
Engagement, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 304 (2013).
5. See Letter from Raimonda Murmokaite, Lithuanian Amb. to U.N., to U.N. Secretary
General, Annex 2, U.N. Doc. No. S/2015/307 (May 1, 2015) [hereinafter UNSC Res. 2222 Concept
Note].
6. See sources cited supra note 4.
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journalists. The first emphasizes the importance of protecting journalists as
civilians who pose no military threat and are thus not legitimate targets of
warfare. Throughout the Note, I refer to this purpose as "individual
humanitarianism." The second, mutually inclusive purpose suggests that
journalists must be protected not only because they are civilians who deserve
individual humanitarian protections, but also because of the function they
perform in transmitting news from the battlefield. Throughout the Note, I refer
to this as the "public-informing" role of journalists.
This Note argues that early IHL protections for journalists were
motivated exclusively by individual humanitarianism. Now, however, IHL
protections for journalists are also motivated by the mutually inclusive public-
informing function of journalists. Because of this shift, this Note argues that
IHL can-and should-be understood not only as protecting journalists as
individuals, but also as protecting journalism as a field.
The importance of this distinction is not purely academic. In June 2015,
the United States Department of Defense published an updated manual on the
laws of war. The manual suggested that some journalists might be targeted as
belligerents, that states had authority to censor journalists' work,9 that there is
no journalistic right of access in IHL,' 0 and that "journalists should act openly
and with the permission of relevant authorities" to avoid being mistaken for
spies. 1 The manual set off a maelstrom of debatel2 that led a Department of
Defense lawyer to announce that Pentagon officials would take public
comments on potential revisions to this portion of the manual. Pushback to
the manual's section on targeting journalists as belligerents closely implicates
their personal safety, reflecting individual humanitarianism. Concerns about the
manual's sections on censorship and access, however, do not implicate
journalists' personal safety and are better understood as reflecting concerns
about journalism's public-informing role. The shift described in this Note
contextualizes the debate about the manual and demonstrates that the question
of why IHL protects journalism might clarify the scope of those protections.
A preliminary aside is necessary to better define what this Note refers to
as journalism. There is serious debate about precisely what constitutes
7. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR
MANUAL (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
8. Id. § 4.24, at 173.
9. Id. § 4.24.5, at 175.
10. Id.
11. Id., § 4.24.4, at 175.
12. See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The DoD Law of War Manual and Its Critics: Some
Observations, 92 INT'L L. STUD. 85, 107-12 (2016); Alan Yuhas, Pentagon Needs to Rethink Calling War
Journalists 'Belligerents', Says Watchdog, GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/aug/i I /pentagon-war-reporters-unprivileged-belligerents-spies;
Editorial, The Pentagon's Dangerous Views on the Wartime Press, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/opinion/the-pentagons-dangerous-views-on-the-wartime-press.html;
Alex Loomis, The New York Times Is Confused About the Law of War Manual, LAWFARE (Aug. 12,
2015, 10:58 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-york-times-confused-about-law-war-manual.
13. See Ernesto Londofio, Opinion, Will the Pentagon Change Its Manual on the Law of War?,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2015, http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/will-the-pentagon-change
-its-manual-on-the-law-of-war.
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journalism. Indeed, as this Note discusses, 14 the precise contours of this debate
might have critical consequences for IHL, regardless of whether or not one
embraces the view that IHL protects journalism as well as journalists. One
recommendation this Note makes is for expert consideration and consultation
of what constitutes a "journalist" and "journalism" under IHL. In this regard, it
would be self-defeating to put forth too precise a definition of my own.
Generally, however, this Note takes "journalism" to refer broadly to the
practice of gathering and disseminating of news in a way that informs the
public.
The Note proceeds in four parts. First, it briefly explains the current law
governing protections of journalists in wartime. Next, it examines the
development of that law and examines how-and more importantly, why-it
came to be. It argues that initial efforts to protect journalists were rooted in
individual humanitarianism, whereas modem efforts also reflect the desire to
protect the public-informing function of journalists. As such, the Note argues, a
purposive reading of IHL might suggest that it protects journalism as a field in
addition to journalists as individuals. The Note next discusses several
implications of reading IHL in this manner. This interpretation of IlL can be
conceptualized as reflecting a shift from a negative state duty to refrain from
intentionally harming journalists to a positive state duty to protect journalism.
The protections might be understood as affecting both journalists' personal
safety and their ability to engage in journalism (in effect, their ability to seek
and transmit information). This conceptualization of the shift has import on
several debates, which Part III discusses. First, it implicates the question of
whether to expand the definition of journalist to better account for citizen
journalists, who often play an important public-informing role. Second, it
implicates questions about increasing journalists' physical access in wartime. If
IHL is indeed understood to confer positive rights of information-seeking on
journalists, states might have an obligation to ensure access to protect the
public-informing value of journalism. Third, it closely implicates questions of
targeting, in terms of distinction and proportionality, both with regard to
journalists as individuals and media infrastructure. If IHL does indeed seek to
protect journalism's public-informing purpose, then this value necessarily
affects tradeoffs that inhere in questions of targeting. Part III of the Note also
considers the effect of reading IHL to protect journalism on the legality of total
or partial Internet shutdown, an issue that closely implicates questions of
defining journalism and targeting. In Part IV, this Note considers some
potential mechanisms of realizing a joumalism-protecting interpretation of
IHL.
I. THE RELEVANT LAW PROTECTING JOURNALISTS
Before charting the history of legal protections for wartime journalists
and interrogating the purpose behind their development, it is important to
briefly introduce the law as it stands.
14. See infra Part III.A.
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A. Treaty-Based IHL
1. 1949 Geneva Conventions
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are comprised of four treaties written in
the aftermath of World War II, to which all nations have now acceded.16 Article
4(A)(4) of the Third Geneva Convention states that among those persons
guaranteed treatment as prisoners of war (POWs) are
[p]ersons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members
thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents,
supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the
welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the
armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with
an identity card.17
Similarly, the First and Second Geneva Conventions, governing the
treatment of the sick and wounded on the battlefield and at sea, respectively,
extend their protections to war correspondents.' 8
These provisions limit their protection to a specialized type of journalist:
the war correspondent. War correspondents receive formal authorization from a
state to accompany its armed forces into conflict.1 9 Unlike other journalists,
war correspondents "are accredited to the armed forces command whose
movements they are reporting." 20 Consequently, the Geneva Conventions
require that the war correspondent receive an identity card conferring the
necessary permission.21 As the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) Commentary to the Conventions notes, the 1949 provisions make POW
status dependent on military authorization to accompany armed forces, with the
identity card merely serving as proof of this authorization.22
15. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
16. See Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, AM. RED
CROSS 1 (Apr. 2011),
http://www.redcross.org/images/MEDIACustomProductCatalog/m3640104_IHL_SummaryGenevaConv
.pdf.
17. Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, art. 4(A)(4).
18. Geneva Convention 1, supra note 15, art. 13(4); Geneva Convention II, supra note 15, art.
13(4).
19. See Ditsterhaft, supra note 4, at 8; How Does International Humanitarian Law Protect
Journalists in Armed-Conflict Situations?, INT'L COMMITrEE OF RED CROSS (Jul. 27, 2010),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/protection-joumalists-interview- 2 70710.htm
[hereinafter Interview with Geiss].
20. C. Pilloud, Protection ofJournalists on Dangerous Missions in Areas ofArmed Conflict,
118 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 3, 4-5 (1971).
21. Cf Interview with Geiss, supra note 19 ("In order to become a war correspondent within
the meaning of international humanitarian law, official accreditation by the armed forces is
mandatory.").
22. INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 64-65 (Jean S. Pictet et al. eds., 1960).
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2. Additional Protocol I
Article 79 of the 1977 first Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions23 (Additional Protocol I) is the most comprehensive IHL treaty
provision protecting j ournalists:
1. Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict
shall be considered as civilians ....
2. They shall be protected as such under the Conventions and this Protocol,
provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians, and
without prejudice to the right of war correspondents accredited to the armed forces
to the status provided for in Article 4A(4) of the Third Convention.
3. They may obtain an identity card similar to the model in Annex II of this
Protocol. This card, which shall be issued by the government of the State of which
the journalist is a national or in whose territory he resides or in which the news
medium employing him is located, shall attest to his status as a journalist.2 4
The ICRC Commentary to the Protocol sheds light on how this definition
of "journalist" might be interpreted. 25 It suggests that "the term 'journalist,' is
understood in a broad sense," 26 and might be read in light of the definition
contained in a draft International Convention for the Protection of Journalists
engaged in Dangerous Missions in Areas of Armed Conflict.27 That draft
defines "journalist" to mean "any correspondent, reporter, photographer, and
their technical film, radio and television assistants who are ordinarily engaged
in any of these activities as their principal occupation." 28 To be sure, the
Commentary does not deem this definition authoritative, but rather suggests
that it is a "guide for the interpretation of Article 79."29 As the Commentary
notes, while "the etymology [of the word 'journalist'] calls to mind
correspondents and reporters writing for a daily newspaper, the present use of
the word covers a much wider circle of people working for the press and other
media."30
The Commentary offers further guidance for interpreting the criterion of
"dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict." It suggests that
23. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
24. Id. art. 79.
25. It is important to note that while the Commentary is influential, it is not legally dispositive.
See Commentary of 2016 Introduction, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf
/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentld=5087F3472575591 CCl257FlI 50049C80B
[hereinafter ICRC 2016 Commentary].
26. INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 921 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmerman, eds. 1987) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY].
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights in Armed Conflicts: Protection of
Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Missions in Areas ofArmed Conflicts, annex I, art. 2(a), U.N. Doc.
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"[t]he concept of a 'professional mission' covers all activities which normally
form part of the journalist's profession in a broad sense: being on the spot,
doing interviews, taking notes, taking photographs or films, sound recording
etc. and transmitting them to his newspaper or agency." 31 It also deems it
"clear" that "any professional activity exercised in an area affected by
hostilities is dangerous by its very nature and is thus covered by the rule."32
B. Customary IHL
In addition to treaty-based IHL, customary IHL recognizes certain
protections for journalists. In 2005, the ICRC published a compendium of
customary IHL, 33 including a rule regarding journalism: that "[c]ivilian
journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of armed conflict must be
respected and protected as long as they are not taking a direct part in
hostilities." 34 The presence of this rule is especially important for two reasons.
First, while all countries have ratified the four 1949 Geneva Conventions,3 5 not
all countries have acceded to Additional Protocol I.36 Those countries that have
not acceded to the Protocol are nevertheless bound by customary IHL. Second,
the customary rule applies to non-international armed conflicts, 37 while
Additional Protocol I does not.38 Additionally, the main treaty-based law
governing non-international armed conflicts does not explicitly protect
journalists.39 Consequently, the presence of a customary IHL rule protecting
journalists expands the scope of protection to non-international armed conflicts.
C. Human Rights Law as Lex Generalis
While treaty-based and customary IHL are the only international
humanitarian legal regimes that govern during wartime, international human
rights law might apply as well. The International Court of Justice has held that
IHL operates as lex specialis during wartime, while human rights law applies as
lex generalis, meaning that IHL does not wholly displace human rights law.40
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. It is worth noting that this study's findings were controversial. See infra notes 231-232 and
accompanying text.
34. 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE RULES 115 (2005).
35. See Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, supra
note 16.
36. See State Parties, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp viewStates=XPagesNORMStatesParties&xp trea
tySelected-470 (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
37. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 34, at 115-16.
38. See Additional Protocol 1, supra note 23, art. 2(3).
39. For the treaty-based IHL governing non-international armed conflicts, see Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 15, art. 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, art. 3; Geneva Convention
I, supra note 15, art. 3; Geneva Convention 1, supra note 15, art. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 11].
40. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep.
226, 1 25 (July 8).
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While the majority of states appear to accept this view, some have explicitly
rejected it, arguing that once IHL applies, human rights law does not.41 Even if
one accepts the view that international human rights law sometimes applies in
armed conflict, the question of where it applies remains unsettled. The United
Nations Human Rights Committee takes the view that the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 2 (ICCPR) applies to "anyone
within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not
situated within the territory of the State Party." 43 The United States,
though, has rejected the notion that the ICCPR has extraterritorial reach.4
Moreover, defining when one state has "effective control" over citizens or
territories of another state is a nuanced and sometimes difficult endeavor.45 in
short, even if human rights law applies, it is not always easy to ascertain where
and when it does.
The difficulty of ascertaining the applicability of human rights law
notwithstanding, the ICCPR includes several provisions that are relevant to
wartime journalism. Most directly, it guarantees that "[e]veryone shall have the
right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice."46 This right is derogable under certain conditions.47 Moreover, the
ICCPR article protecting freedom of expression has within it a limitation that
allows "certain restrictions . . . as are provided by law and are necessary ...
[flor the protection of national security or of public order,A 8 though the Human
Rights Committee has made clear that such restrictions "must conform to ...
strict tests."49
The upshot here is that, while international human rights law applies as
lex generalis in wartime, the nuances of precisely what this means remain
41. Frangoise J. Hampson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
549, 550-51 (2008); cf Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, William Perdue,
Chelsea Purvis & Julia Spiegel, Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship Between
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 MiNN. L. REV. 1883, 1896-97 (2012).
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 9, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
43. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26,
2004).
44. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article
40 of the Covenant: United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.1, at 2 (Feb.
12, 2008) ("The United States takes this opportunity to reaffirm its long-standing position that the
Covenant does not apply extraterritorially . . . . Accordingly, the United States respectfully disagrees
with the view of the Committee. . . .").
45. For an especially good discussion about the sometimes convoluted nature of determining
effective control (in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, not the ICCPR), see
Marko Milanovic, European Court Decides Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda, EJIL: TALK! (July 7, 2011),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-al-skeini-and-al-jedda.
46. ICCPR, supra note 42, art. 19(1).
47. Id. art. 4.
48. Id. art. 19.
49. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, 1 22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34
(Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter General Comment 34].
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heavily debated, including in the context of free expression and press.so
Consequently, IHL protections for journalism remain uniquely important
during wartime.
II. THE SHIFTING PURPOSE OF PROTECTING JOURNALISTS IN
WARTIME
Part I offered an abbreviated overview of the current law protecting
journalists during wartime. This Part of the Note tracks the history of the law
and considers the impetus and motivations for its development. In doing so, it
argues that the reasons for which IHL protects wartime journalists have
changed. Whereas in the past, the purpose of protecting wartime journalists was
exclusively individual humanitarianism, there is now a second reason for doing
so: their public-informing function. As this Part shows, when states expanded
IHL protections for journalists, they were motivated in part by an
understanding that journalism is an important tool in enforcing IHL more
generally, both by ensuring compliance and punishing noncompliance. The
public-informing function thus reflects the notion that protecting journalists is
not only an important value and end in and of itself, but also a means to another
end: the protection of civilians more broadly.
A. A BriefHistory ofPre-1949 IHL Governing Journalists
Although laws and customs have regulated warfare for centuries, it is
only in the last century and a half that the laws of war have been codified into
centralized governing documents.5 1 To the extent that these early documents
protected journalists, it was exclusively because of individual humanitarian
concerns and not because of the public-informing value of journalism.
Wartime legal protections for journalists date to 1863, when Abraham
Lincoln issued General Orders Number 100: Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, a set of regulations governing the
behavior of the Union Army on the Civil War battlefield.52 General Orders
Number 100-commonly known as the Lieber Code after its principal drafter,
Francis Lieber-regulated a wide array of military conduct, including the
treatment ofjournalists. 53 The Lieber Code's Article 50 specified that "citizens
who accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as . . . editors, or reporters
of journals, . . . if captured, may be made prisoners of war, and be detained as
50. For a detailed discussion of the interplay between Article 19 and IHL, see Hathaway et al.,
supra note 41, at 1939-42.
51. Development of Modern International Humanitarian Law, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS
(2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/history/since-1945/history-ihl/overview-development
-modern-international-humanitarian-law.htm.
52. For a comprehensive history of General Orders 100, see generally JOHN FABIAN WITT,
LINCOLN'S WAR: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2012).
53. The Lieber Code itself was based on treatises authored by scholars of international custom,
which had served as detailed compendiums of international practice. Very few of these treatises
addressed wartime protection of journalists. Amos S. Hershey, War Correspondents, Wireless
Telegraphy and Submarine Mines, 16 GREEN BAG 595, 597 (1904) ("[T]he status of war correspondents
is one which is seldom ever touched upon by publicists on International Law."). This is not altogether
surprising, given the relative novelty of war correspondents. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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such." 54 Article 50 allowed states to detain journalists, but ensured that
captured journalists were entitled to POW status, which conferred important
benefits. 5 Moreover, it clearly identified journalists as citizens accompanying
an army, ensuring that journalists would be viewed not as enemy belligerents,
but as ordinary civilians performing a specific task.
While the first major international convention on the laws of war-the
1864 Geneva Convention-did not offer any specific protections for
journalists, 56 its more robust successor conventions did include some
protections. The 1899 Hague Convention and its 1907 expansion both
guaranteed certain protections to journalists. In some ways, the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions mirrored the protections of the Lieber Code, guaranteeing
that "[i]ndividuals who follow an army without directly belonging to it, such as
newspaper correspondents and reporters, . . . who fall into the enemy's hands,
and whom the latter thinks expedient to detain, are entitled to be treated as
prisoners of war." 57 This mirrors the guarantee of POW status, yet makes
explicit another requirement left implicit in the Lieber Code: armies may only
detain reporters if they think doing so is "expedient." While this capacious
standard leaves the decision to detain to the discretion of the capturing army, it
still serves as something of a bulwark by ensuring that detention is not
automatic. Unlike the Lieber Code, however, the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions required that reporters could benefit from POW status only if they
possessed a certificate from the military they accompanied. " The 1929
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War largely mirrored the
language of the Hague Conventions in its Article 81.59
Relative to the post-World War II Conventions, there is little primary
source information that elucidates why these documents encompassed specific
protections for journalists. The Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and
1907 discuss changes made to those Conventions that clarified the meaning of
previous documents. 60 It noted that while "these persons [could not] really be
54. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order
No. 100, art. 50 (Apr. 24, 1863), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp.
55. For example, the Lieber Code guaranteed that "[a] prisoner of war is subject to no
punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction
of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other
barbarity." Id. art. 56. The Code also set certain minimum standards for POW conditions of confinement
and regulated prisoner swaps. Id. arts. 105-10.
56. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field,
Aug. 22, 1864, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 1864 Geneva Convention].
57. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 13 [hereinafter 1907
Hague Convention]; Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, art. 13
[hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention].
58. Id.
59. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 81, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter 1929 Geneva Convention].
60. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 provided, "Individuals in the vicinity of armies but not
directly forming part of them, such as correspondents, newspaper reporters, sutlers, contractors, etc., can
also be made prisoners. These prisoners should however be in possession of a permit issued by the
competent authority and of a certificate of identity." Project of an International Declaration Concerning
the Laws and Customs of War art. 34, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A
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considered as prisoners of war at all . . . . it may be necessary to detain them
either temporarily or until the end of the war." 6 1 In such situations, it was
preferable that they be entitled to POW treatment.62
This Report confirms a tension that the provisional text revealed: that war
correspondents accompanying an army should not be considered legitimate
military targets but that, at times, it may be militarily expedient to detain them.
In this regard, early texts privileged military expediency over any public-
informing function of journalists' work. As such, the underlying motivation for
protecting the correspondents appears to stem from individual humanitarian
concerns, allowing detention when expedient, but ensuring fair treatment for
detained war correspondents.
The fact that the relevant provisions protecting war correspondents
safeguarded various other professionals accompanying militaries further
indicates this individual humanitarian purpose to the exclusion of other
purposes. The relevant provisions lumped war correspondents with sutlers and
contractors, for example.63 Sutlers and contractors have no public-facing role,
let alone a public-informing role. This suggests that the provision was not
primarily concerned with the import of the information that war correspondents
provided to public. Rather, it was motivated by individual humanitarianism: to
ensure that, to the extent possible, civilians officially authorized to accompany
a military could benefit from POW privileges or avoid imprisonment
altogether.
Early IHL documents protected only official war correspondents, rather
than all journalists and reporters. War correspondents have official permission
to accompany militaries and thus, unlike independent journalists, cannot
completely "operate 'independently' of these influences." 6 Correspondents
were subject to limitations that a military might impose, including censorship.
Consider, for example, the first modem war correspondent, William Howard
Russell of the London Times. Russell began reporting from the Crimean War in
1854 and his reports were subject to strict censorship.65
To the extent that military necessity and expediency trumped any public-
informing purpose of journalism, states may not have had the desire to offer
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 21, 26 (Dietrich Schindler &
Jiri Toman eds., 4th rev. & completed ed. 2004). The Institute of International Law appointed a
committee to study the Brussels Declaration and adopted what came to be known as the Oxford Manual
in 1880. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra, at 21. The Oxford Manual provided, "Individuals who
accompany an army, but who are not part of the regular armed force of the State, such as
correspondents, traders, sutlers, etc., and who fall into the hands of the enemy, may be detained for such
length of time only as is warranted by strict military necessity." Manual of the Laws and Customs of
War art. 22, Sept. 9, 1880, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra, at 29, 33. Both the
Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Oxford Manual of 1880 became the basis of the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions and Regulations annexed to them. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra, at 21.
6' Edouard Rolin, Report to the Conference from the Second Commission on the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, reprinted in THE REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 137, 144
(James Brown Scott ed., 1916).
62. Id.
63. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 57, art. 13; 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 57,
art. 13.
64. Dilsterhdft, supra note 4, at 7-8.
65. BURRI, supra note 4, at 6.
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explicit protections to independent journalists by giving them POW status.
Indeed, the very reason early IHL specially protected war correspondents is
because of this close relationship.66 Moreover, governments had incentive to try
to maintain control over the flow of information. Through advances in media
technology, journalists upended government monopolies on battlefield
information and brought home the horrors of war, to which "the public reacted
with furor." 67
To be sure, war correspondents' work did have some public-informing
impact that was not necessarily favorable to armies in the field and had
tremendous domestic effects.68 They were not mere stenographers for military
propaganda. At the same time, they depended on military consent and support
in a way that independent journalists did not.
Structurally, protecting only war correspondents made sense. Unlike
modem IHL, early IHL instruments were enforced through reciprocity: if two
signatories to an IHL instrument engaged in warfare and one side breached its
obligations, the other was entitled to do so as well. If a signatory to an IHL
instrument engaged in warfare against a non-signatory, the signatory had no
obligation to respect the rules of that instrument.69 In short, it was a system that
relied on states' strategic or normative desire to protect their own troops and
civilians. In this regard, states were understandably more concemed with
respecting the rights of war correspondents that their counterparts had
authorized, rather than independent journalists. In doing so, they could ensure
that the war correspondents they themselves had authorized would be
protected.
An illuminating historical incident demonstrates the extent to which the
public-informing function of joumalism was subverted to military expediency.
In 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Russians announced that they
would treat war correspondents found to be using wireless telegraph technology
in neutral waters as spies.70 Wireless telegraphy was a new technological
advancement and the Russians were ostensibly concerned that the Japanese
could intercept it. The Russian threat was especially concerning to the British
and the Americans: the London Times and the New York Times had partnered to
place a correspondent on a ship operating in neutral waters and transmitting
messages to a neutral land-based station, which subsequently transmitted them
66. Interview with Geiss, supra note 19. To be sure, one way of interpreting early IHL's
protection of war correspondents to the exclusion of other journalists is that they were simply more
likely to be captured because war correspondents traveled with armed forces. While this is a reasonable
interpretation, states were aware of the nearly simultaneous emergence of both war correspondence and
independent wartime journalism. See BURR], supra note 4, at 7-8.
67. Eyal Benvenisti & Amichai Cohen, War Is Governance. Explaining the Logic of the Laws
of War from a Principal-Agent Perspective, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1390 (2014) (quoting JOHN F.
HUTCHINsoN, CHAMPIONS OF CHARITY 26 (1996)).
68. See BURRI, supra note 4, at 6-8.
69. See, e.g., 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 57, art. 2 ("The provisions contained in the
Regulations . . . are only binding on the Contracting Powers, in case of war between two or more of
them. These provisions shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between Contracting
Powers, a non-Contracting Power joins one of the belligerents."); 1899 Hague Convention, supra note
57, art. 2 (same).
70. See Russia Puts Ban on Wireless News, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 1904.
426
The Pen and the Sword
to London and New York. 71 The British and American governments
vociferously protested, as did both newspapers. 72 The nature of their protest is
revealing. The London Times acknowledged that it "ha[d] never questioned the
absolute right of belligerents to subordinate the activity of newspaper
correspondents to the paramount exigencies of warfare." 73 Its editorial board
wrote: "The right of belligerents to exercise full control over news transmitted
from the seat of war is one which neither we nor, we imagine, our readers
desire to call into question. In times of war military considerations must take
precedence over the legitimate claim of the public to be informed ... "74 The
New York Times freely conceded that, per international law, if its correspondent
were not in neutral territory, it would submit itself to censorship as required for
military necessity. 75 While the public-informing function of journalism was
mentioned, it was subordinated to military necessity. Overall, little emphasis
was placed on the public-informing role of journalists and the crux of the
controversy was the individual humanitarian fate of journalists as civilians and
the violation of neutrality principles in war.
B. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Rise ofHuman Rights Law
The 1949 Geneva Conventions did not greatly expand protections for
journalists, reflecting a continuation of individual humanitarianism as the sole
purpose for protecting journalists. The Conventions' protections still covered
76
only war correspondents, although they did move the needle forward in a
subtle, yet important, way. While some delegates to the preparatory Conference
initially proposed that the requirement that war correspondents actually possess
a formal identity card authorizing them to accompany the army-mirroring
previous conventions-the Conventions abandoned this requirement.77 Instead,
they allowed for POW status for those authorized to accompany militaries even
if they did not have an identity card in their possession (for example, because
they lost it, as had happened in World War II).78 As the Commentary to the
Conventions notes, the 1949 Conventions modified language that:
made possession of an identity card an absolute condition of the right to be treated
as a prisoner of war . .. and the resulting text included in the Convention is more
flexible. [POW status] is therefore dependent on authorization to accompany the
armed forces, and the identity card merely serves as proof.7 9
Notwithstanding the subtlety of this change, the Geneva Conventions
reflected two watershed moments in IHL. First, the reciprocity-based system
71. See How the Times Gets War News by "Wireless," N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1904.
72. Russia Puts Ban on Wireless News, supra note 70.
73. London Times Declares Russia's Course Illogical, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1904.
74. London Times Replies to Russia's Threat, supra note 2.
75. Editorial, The New Russian Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1904.
76. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Geneva Convention IV, supra note 15,
art. 4(A)(4).
77. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 65.
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was abandoned. Unlike most80 of their IHL predecessors, the 1949 Conventions
imposed their obligations on states in all circumstances. If two signatories
fought against one another, one could not violate the Geneva Conventions
simply because the other did. Likewise, if a signatory fought a non-signatory, it
would still be bound. Second, Common Article 3 of the Conventions governed
non-international (or internal) conflicts.82 Although its protections were limited,
Common Article 3 nevertheless represented a "revolutionary inroad into
traditional notions of State sovereignty. "83 Though neither of these two shifts
implicated the rights of journalists, they each represented important examples
of states constraining their behavior to principles of humanity8 and were, in
this regard, both harbingers.
If Common Article 3 cracked the door of traditional state sovereignty,
international human rights law flung it open. In the years following the 1949
Conventions, states acceded to a variety of international human rights
instruments in which they constrained their behavior in order to further
principles of humanity and dignity. As Theodor Meron has noted:
[I]t is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other post-Charter human
rights treaties and declarations that explain the focus of the Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocols on individuals and populations . . . . The fact that the law
of war and human rights law stem from different historical and doctrinal roots has
not prevented the principle of humanity from becoming the common denominator
85
of both systems.
The rise of human rights law reveals at least two important insights when
interrogating subsequent expansion of IHL protections for journalists. First,
human rights law, in ICCPR Article 19, protects freedom of expression and
access to information.86 Along with the other guarantees of the human rights
80. The 1929 Geneva Convention had a similar clause to the 1949 Conventions' Common
Article 1. 1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 59, art. 82(1). Nevertheless, the 1949 Conventions made
the point more prominently. See supra note 81.
81. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 15, art. I ("The High Contracting Parties undertake
to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances."); Geneva Convention
III, supra note 15, art. 1 (same); Geneva Convention II, supra note 15, art. I (same); Geneva Convention
I, supra note 15, art. I (same). Collectively, these provisions are known as Common Article 1. The 1952
Commentary to Common Article 1 explains that
[b]y undertaking at the very outset to respect the clauses of the Convention, the Contracting
Parties draw attention to the special character of that instrument. It is not an engagement
concluded on a basis of reciprocity, binding each party to the contract only in so far as the
other party observes its obligations. It is rather a series of unilateral engagements solemnly
contracted before the world as represented by the other Contracting Parties.
COMMENTARY: I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED
AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 25 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952). But see Sean Watts, Reciprocity
and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 365, 386 (2009) ("Even after the most important and
humanitarian-focused revision of the law of war in 1949, reciprocity was never entirely eliminated in a
positivist sense. Rather, conditions of reciprocity merely changed form.").
82. Geneva Convention I, supra note 15, art. 3; Geneva Convention It, supra note 15, art. 3;
Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 15, art. 3.
83. Gabor Rona, Is There a Way out of the Non-International Armed Conflict Detention
Dilemma?, 91 INT'L L. STUD. 32, 36 (2015).
84. Cf Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239
(2000) (discussing the process through which the rise of human rights law and principles of humanity
and dignity affected IHL).
85. Id. at 245.
86. ICCPR, supra note 42, art. 19(1).
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revolution, these freedoms were elevated in an important way. Second, the rise
of human rights law reveals broader concern with principles of humanity and
individual dignity and affirms their inviolability; at least under ordinary
circumstances, states could no longer rely on a sovereignty defense to infringe
on basic rights. Moreover, states could no longer simply argue that they were
entitled to violate such rights as reciprocity for others violating them.
C. Additional Protocol I
The rise of human rights law serves as crucial context in understanding
Additional Protocol I and helps inform how the purpose of protecting
journalists changed during this period. Meron has noted that "[t]he renaissance
of the law of war in the early 1970s was triggered by human rights.. . . Law of
war experts have recognized that the development of international humanitarian
law had approached stagnation before the influence of the human rights
movement was brought to bear."87 The purpose of the Additional Protocols was
to strengthen IHL protections for civilians in both international and non-
international armed conflict and advance what Meron has called the
"humanization of humanitarian law." 88 It is against this backdrop that
protections for journalists were expanded. To be sure, this expansion was
motivated in part by the individual humanitarian concern for journalist safety.
But an examination of the history of Additional Protocol I reveals an
understanding that journalists must be protected not only because of their own
civilian status, but also because their public-informing function helps protect
other civilians.
Key documents reflect the public-informing motivator, including those
that set the stage for Additional Protocol Article 79. Article 79 has a distinct
history from other articles of Additional Protocols I and II. While most
provisions originated in a pair of Diplomatic Conferences convened by the
ICRC in 1971 and 1972, protections for journalists originated elsewhere. On
France's initiative, the United Nations General Assembly in 1970 invited the
Economic and Social Council to request that the Commission on Human Rights
consider preparing a draft international agreement to strengthen protections of
journalists in wartime. 90 The Resolution emphasized both journalists' personal
sacrifice and their public role, "[n]ot[ing] with regret that journalists engaged in
missions in areas where an armed conflict is taking place sometimes suffer as a
result of their professional duty, which is to inform world public opinion
objectively . . ."91 Moreover, the Resolution was clear in asserting journalists'
public-informing role: "Considering that it is essential for the United Nations to
obtain complete information concerning armed conflicts and that journalists,
whatever their nationality, have an important role to play in that regard .... 92
87. Meron, supra note 84, at 247.
88. Id.
89. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 919.
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The Human Rights Commission took up the issue at its next session and
some of its findings were memorialized by the General Assembly, including the
Commission's "conviction that there was an urgent need to examine the
question of the protection of journalists engaged in dangerous missions, both on
humanitarian grounds and in order to enable journalists with due respect for the
law to seek, receive and impart information fully, objectively and faithfully." 93
Meanwhile, the ICRC's Conference of Government Experts, which was
working towards expanding IHL protections generally, took up the issue at the
invitation of the U.N. Secretary-General.94 The report from the Conference
demonstrates that the government experts considered both the individual
humanitarian purpose and public-informing purpose of expanding protections
for journalists. At the Conference, "[s]everal experts pointed out the need for
adequate protection of journalists on dangerous missions, both for the
journalists' own safety and for the freedom of the press, which could not but
contribute to the respect and development of humanitarian law." 95
A second Conference of the Government Experts convened in 1972
following the Human Rights Commission's suggestions and the second
aforementioned U.N. General Assembly Resolution. The second Conference
was perhaps even clearer than its predecessor in articulating the value of
journalism:
Of the experts who spoke on this subject, the majority were ... in favour of
granting special protection to journalists engaged in dangerous missions and
thought that this should be done by means of a special Convention. They put
forward two arguments in support of this opinion: in the first place, it was in the
interest of world public opinion that the events connected with armed conflicts
should be the subject of the widest possible news dissemination and reporting; and,
secondly, that the spread of information and the presence of journalists on the spot
could contribute to a more effective implementation of humanitarian law in armed
conflicts. It was therefore in the interest of the international community that96journalists should run risks .... .
The historical record of Article 79-which is the most recent and robust
treaty-based law governing IIHL protections of journalists-clearly
demonstrates a concern with a protection of journalism as well as journalists.
To be sure, the individual humanitarian protection of journalist life and limb
was an important motivating end unto itself. Nevertheless, it was also a means
to another end: ensuring that the public and relevant institutions had the benefit
of robust, detailed, and objective reports from war zones.
93. G.A. Res. 2854 (XXVI), at 92 (Dec. 20, 1971).
94. Report on the Work of the Conference, Conference of Government Experts on the
Reaffirmation and Development ofInternational Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, INT'L
CoMM. RED CROSS ¶ 507 (1971), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/RC-Report-conf-of-gov
-experts-1971.pdf [hereinafter 1971 Conference Report].
95. Id.
96. 1 Report on the Work of the Conference, Conference of Government Experts on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
INT'L COMMITTEE RED CROSS ¶ 3.78 (1972), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/RC-Report
-conf-of-gov-experts-1972 V-i.pdf [hereinafter 1972 Conference Report].
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D. Post-1977
In the years since the adoption of Additional Protocol I, evidence
suggests that the dual purposes of protecting journalists-the individual
humanitarian purpose and the public-informing purpose-prevail. If anything,
emphasis on the latter purpose has grown.
The United Nations has continued its focus on protecting wartime
journalists and, in doing so, has continued to emphasize the crucial public-
informing role these journalists play. Most recently, in 2015, the United
Nations Security Council unanimously approved a resolution in which it
"[r]ecogniz[ed] that journalists, media professionals and associated personnel
can play an important role in protection of civilians and conflict prevention by
acting as an early warning mechanism in identifying and reporting potential
situations that could result in genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity," 97 and "[a]ffirm[ed] that the work of a free, independent and
impartial media constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and thereby can contribute to the protection of civilians." 98 The
Resolution also highlighted the relevance of ICCPR Article 19 and its
corresponding article in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, affirming
the view that these instruments apply in wartime. In this regard, the
Resolution reflected a strong protection of wartime freedom of expression and
information. The concept note behind the Resolution announced that "[t]oday's
world is highly dependent on swift, even real-time, access to information.,,1oo
This view stands in stark contrast to, for example, the concessions made by the
London Times Editorial Board during the Russo-Japanese War, and reflects the
broader trend toward protecting journalism due to its public-informing purpose.
Moreover, the notion of dependence on real-time access to information reflects
a growing understanding of the role of social media in journalism.10' The
concept note also explicitly referred to access issues:
To carry out their work and inform the public and the international community of
unfolding crises, journalists need access. The availability of credible information
from conflict zones to the local population and the international community can
have an important lifesaving aspect because it is often instrumental in mobilizing
international attention and, eventually, assistance and action aimed at protecting
civilians in conflict zones. Freedom of information legislation is, however, most
often lacking in conflict and immediate post-conflict situations and there are few, if
any, measures to protect journalists. 0 2
In a similar vein, a report by the Secretary-General on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict addressed dangers to journalists specifically. In
doing so, it reaffirmed journalists' civilian status and also noted their role in
protecting other civilians: "Journalists play a crucial role by reporting on the
treatment and suffering endured by civilians in situations of conflict and on
97. S.C. Res. 2222, 1 13 (May 27, 2015).
98. Id.124.
99. See id.¶9.
100. UNSC Res. 2222 Concept Note, supra note 5, at 2.
101. See infra Part III.A.
102. UNSC Res. 2222 Concept Note, supra note 5, at 4.
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violations of humanitarian law and human rights." 0 3
In a 2013 report, the Human Rights Committee explicitly referenced the
importance of journalist access in wartime and "[c]all[ed] on all parties to
armed conflict to respect their obligations under international human rights law
and international humanitarian law . . . to allow, within the framework of
applicable rules and procedures, media access and coverage, as appropriate, in
situations of international and non-international armed conflict."
The understanding that journalism plays a uniquely important role in
protecting against abuses has been acknowledged beyond the U.N. system. The
United Kingdom's law of armed conflict manual, for example, notes that media
publicity about alleged war crimes is an important IHL enforcement tool and
often leads to further action to protect civilians. Germany's manual reflects a
similar sentiment:
Public reporting of violations of international law can support the enforcement of
international law. With a global information network, the media (such as the press,
radio, television, [I]nternet, [T]witter) and their means of transmission (such as
radio communication and satellites) are today able to do so in a comparably better,
faster and therefore more effective way than in past armed conflicts.
Prominently, in the so-called Randal case, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)- offered a detailed explanation of
the importance of wartime journalism.1 07 In that case, the ICTY considered the
legality of subpoenaing war correspondents to testify in cases before the
tribunal. The Trial Chamber ruled that the subpoena was appropriate, but it
acknowledged that "journalists reporting on conflict areas play a vital role in
bringing to the attention of the international community the horrors and reality
of the conflict."10 On appeal, the Appeals Chamber reversed the decision. It
offered a robust defense of the importance of journalists' work, concluding that
because "vigorous investigation and reporting by war correspondents enables
citizens of the international community to receive vital information from war
zones . . . adequate weight must be given to protecting the ability of war
correspondents to carry out their functions." ' Moreover, the Appeals
Chamber held that forcing journalists to testify at war crimes tribunals could
negatively affect their work, finding "that compelling war correspondents to
testify before the International Tribunal on a routine basis may have a
significant impact upon their ability to obtain information and thus their ability
to inform the public on issues of general concern."110
103. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict, T 14, U.N. Doe. No. S/2012/376 (May 22, 2012).
104. Rep. of the H.R.C., 21st Sess. 40, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/2 (Aug. 26, 2013).
105. MINISTRY OF DEF., THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 16.1
(2004) (United Kingdom).
106. FED. MINISTRY OF DEF., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL § 1541 (2013) (Germany).
107. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Tali6, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion to Set Aside
Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 7, 2002).
108. Id. ¶ 25
109. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Tali6, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal, ¶ 38 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 11, 2002) [hereinafter "Randal Appeal"].
110. Id.¶41.
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Crucially, the Appellate Chamber discussed the consequences of forcing
journalists to testify as both affecting their personal safety and their public-
informing function. "First," the Chamber noted, journalists "may have
difficulties in gathering significant information because the interviewed
persons, particularly those committing human rights violations."
Additionally, the Chamber expressed concern that, if forced to testify, "war
correspondents may shift from being observers of those committing human
rights violations to being their targets, thereby putting their own lives at
risk."' 1 2
The ICTY recognized one of the benefits of this information as the ability
to punish war crimes. The court noted that information gathered and publicized
by journalists had helped the court in its own work in identifying and punishing
violations of international humanitarian law. 11 3
As the ICTY's Randal discussion demonstrates, the work of journalists
can provide crucial assistance to the investigation and prosecution of war
crimes in instances in which a government or international body is seeking to
punish perpetrators. The theme of journalism's role in effective IHL
implementation was discussed in the process leading to Additional Protocol I.
Recall that the U.N. Resolution that set the Article 79 process in motion
recognized journalism's role in fulfilling the "essential [need] for the United
Nations to obtain complete information concerning armed conflicts,"114 and
that government experts at the second ICRC Conference acknowledged that
"the presence of journalists on the spot could contribute to a more effective
implementation of humanitarian law in armed conflicts."" 5 Also at that
Conference, some experts noted that "control of the application of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 would be strengthened if journalists-who were able to
inform the public on the conduct of military operations-would enjoy greater
protection."116 In this regard, in addition to recognizing the ex ante role
journalism can play in preventing war crimes, the international discourse
surrounding protection of journalists has also acknowledged thejus post bellum
role they play in identifying and punishing war crimes.
In short, as IHL protections for journalists have expanded, so too has the
public discourse about why they should be expanded. Whereas at the dawn of
IL, the purpose of protecting journalists was purely individual
humanitarianism and their public-informing role was subverted to military
expediency, this is no longer the case. From the advent of the international
human rights system until today, the international discourse about why we
protect journalists reveals that there is now a premium placed on the public
information they provide. Journalists have been credited for helping to prevent




114. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
116. 1971 Conference Report, supra note 94, 1 509.
117. BuRRI, supra note 4, at 327.
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happen. 11 In this regard, IHL has increasingly moved towards implicitly
protecting both wartime journalists as individuals and wartime journalism as a
field, rather than only protecting the former.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The previous Part demonstrated that there is strong evidence to suggest
that the laws of war can-and should-be read to support the notion that
journalists' work is protected. This shift from the individual humanitarian to the
public-informing purposes for protecting journalists can be conceptualized as a
shift from negative to positive rights. Under early IHL instruments, states were
prohibited from targeting journalists for harm; nevertheless, if expedient, they
were entitled to hold joumalists as POWs. Now, states might be understood to
have certain positive obligations in order to protect the public-informing role of
journalism. Specifically, these might be conceptualized as affirmative
obligations related to physical protection and protection of access. Indeed, the
ICRC's compendium on customary international law already suggests as much,
noting that journalists must be "respected and protected,"1 which implies an
affirmative obligation. This Part of the Note considers several possible
implications. As a preliminary matter, the notion that states have affirmative
duties to protect journalism has implications for who might benefit from
expanded protections, especially in the context of citizen journalism and social
media. An affirmative obligation to protect journalism also implicates issues of
journalist access, reflecting journalists' positive right to seek information and
impart it to the public. A positive obligation to protect journalism also
implicates the interrelated targeting questions of distinction and proportionality,
both in terms of journalists themselves and the media infrastructure that
journalists use. The question of infrastructure targeting is especially relevant in
the context of total or partial Internet shutdown, since such shutdown occurs
through non-violent means and is thus distinct from, say, the bombing of a
television station. To be sure, some of these questions are implicated even if
one understands IHL as protecting journalists for purely individual
humanitarian reasons. Nevertheless, understanding IHL as protecting
journalism because of its public-informing role brings into relief the importance
of the values at stake. Tradeoffs inhere in questions of distinction and
proportionality. A better understanding of the values at stake-whether the
individual humanitarian values alone or both the individual humanitarian and
public-informing values-would affect the calculus of how to approach such
issues.
A. Citizen Journalism
If one understands IHL to protect journalism in addition to journalists,
there is a crucial question of what counts as journalism. This question persists
even if one focuses on the individual humanitarian purpose of protecting
118. Id. at 316-17.
119. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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journalists,120 but its stakes are augmented and better defined by a focus on the
public-informing role of journalists. The nature of journalism has changed
substantially since Additional Protocol I was drafted. Social media has
transformed the ways in which news is transmitted and received.121 Today,
anyone with a smartphone and Internet connection can record any event and
transmit it across the world. Indeed, some phone-based applications were
developed precisely because of this potential. Consider Periscope, an
application that allows users to live stream video to global viewers. Kayvon
Beykpour, a Periscope co-founder, conceived of the application in early 2014
after traveling to Istanbul during the Taksim Square protests and being unable
to remotely watch what was occurring.122 Social media postings transmit news,
but their impact is more far-reaching. In some instances, they replace
traditional media apparatuses in "a fluid and participatory information
platform." 23
Like more traditional journalism, social media posts can be early warning
signs for war crimes.124 Moreover, as a recent article demonstrates, they can
help detect and punish these crimes.125
In some instances, the news-breaking nature is a matter of happenstance.
Consider the case of Sohaib Athar. In May 2011, Athar was a thirty-three-year-
old information technology consultant based in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Early
one morning, he tweeted, "Helicopter hovering above Abbottabad at 1AM (is a
rare event)," 126 and followed up with several related tweets.127 Athar had
unknowingly live-tweeted the U.S. Navy Seals' raid on Osama bin Laden's
compound.128 Athar's accidental reporting is a somewhat amusing illustration
of the power of social media users to break news, but other instances of citizens
breaking news are less accidental and far less amusing. Ahmed Mohamed al-
Mousa's story is one such example. In 2014, as the Islamic State of Iraq and
Levant (ISIS) declared Raqqa its capital, traditional news media fled. Al-Mousa
and several other Syrian activists formed Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently
(RBSS) in order to document the abuses of ISIS.129 The Committee to Protect
120. Others have considered the breadth of IHL protections for citizen journalists. See, e.g.,
BURRI, supra note 4, at 103-11.
121. For one thoughtful examination of the relationship between wartime journalism and social
media, see Vittoria Sacco & Diana Bossio, Using Social Media in the News Reportage of War &
Conflict: Opportunities and Challenges, 2 J. MEDIA INNOVATIONS 59 (2015).
122. Alyson Shontell, What It's Like to Sell Your Startup for -$120 Million Before It's Even
Launched: Meet Twitter's New Prized Possession, Periscope, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2015, 9:44
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-periscope-and-why-twitter-bought-it-2015-3.
123. Andrds Monroy-Hernindez et al., Narcotweets: Social Media in Wartime, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 515, 515 (2012),
http://www.research.microsoft.com/pubs/160380/ICWSM 12-093.pdf.
124. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
125. Keith Hiatt, Open Source Evidence on Trial, 125 YALE L.J. F. 323 (2016),
http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/forum/open-source-evidence-on-trial.
126. See VALERIE BELAIR-GAGNON, SOCIAL MEDIA AT BBC NEWS: THE RE-MAKING OF
CRISIS REPORTING 68 (2015).
127. Id. at 69.
128. Id.
129. International Press Freedom Awards: Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, Syria, COMM.
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Journalists gave RBSS the International Press Freedom Award, noting:
[RBSS] is one of the few reliable and independent sources of news left in the
Islamic State stronghold. The group's Raqqa-based members secretly film and
report from within the city and send the information to members outside of Syria,
who transfer the news to local and international media. Since its inception, RBSS
has publicized public lashings, crucifixions, beheadings, and draconian social rules,
thus providing the world with a counter-narrative to Islamic State's slickly
produced version of events.130
On December 16, 2015, al-Mousa was fatally shot by a masked gunman
in front of his family home in Abu al-Duhur, a town in Syria's Idlib
province. 131
Al-Mousa was not a professional journalist in the commonly understood
meaning of the word "professional."1 32 Indeed, the Commentary to Additional
Protocol I, while acknowledging that the term "journalist" should be defined
broadly, references the draft International Convention for the Protection of
Journalists engaged in Dangerous Missions in Areas of Armed Conflict. This
draft Convention defines "journalist" to mean "any correspondent, reporter,
photographer, and their technical film, radio and television assistants who are
ordinarily engaged in any of these activities as their principal occupation."1 33 if
one uses this definition, by a plain reading of its terms, Additional Protocol I's
Article 79 does not include al-Mousa. Yet, by other definitions that have been
put forward, al-Mousa would be considered a journalist. The Human Rights
Committee has issued a General Comment on International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights Article 19 (on freedoms of opinion and expression) that
defined journalism as "a function shared by a wide range of actors, including
professional full-time reporters and analysts, as well as bloggers and others
who engage in forms of self-publication in print, on the internet or
elsewhere." 34 A 2012 Report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions defined "'journalist' [as] any
natural or legal person who is regularly or professionally engaged in the
collection and dissemination of information to the public via any means of
mass communication," and specifically included the "'new media' or citizen
and 'online journalists'" Either of these definitions would appear to include
TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (2015), https://cpj.org/awards/2015/raqqa-is-being-slaughtered-silently-syria
.php.
130. Id.
131. Ahmed Mohamed al-Mousa: Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently December 16, 2015, in
Idlib, Syria, COMM. To PROTECT JOURNALISTS, https://cpj.org/killed/2015/ahmed-mohamed-al-mousa
.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
132. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "professional" in several ways. One definition is
"[r]elating to or connected with a profession," where "profession" is defined as "[a] paid occupation,
especially one that involves prolonged training and a formal qualification." Another is "([o]f a person)
engaged in a specified activity as one's main paid occupation rather than as a pastime." Another, as
"[hiaving or showing the skill appropriate to a professional person; competent or skillful." Finally as
"[w]orthy of or appropriate to a professional person." The first and second definitions require the
activity in question to be a paid occupation, while the third and fourth do not. OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2007).
133. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 921.
134. General Comment 34, supra note 49, ¶ 44.
135. Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions),
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al-Mousa and his colleagues.
To be sure, determining who can benefit from expanding the definition of
journalist is not an easy process. At a high level of generality, there is an
intuitive distinction to be drawn between a random citizen who happens to be
near an important event and records the moment with her phone and a citizen
journalist who actively seeks stories on which to report objectively and
attempts to disseminate those stories widely. Christof Heyns and Sharath
Srinivasan have argued in this context that "there is no point in saying that
everyone who uses the internet or social media is a journalist who deserves
special protection . . . [because i]f everyone is a journalist and therefore worthy
of special protection, then in effect no one is." 136
Under this framework, Athar's tweets about the bin Laden raid would
probably not qualify as journalism, notwithstanding their noteworthiness.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering that significant news is often reported by
random passers-by with cameras or smartphones. Recently, a video showed an
Israeli Defense Forces soldier shooting and killing an incapacitated Palestinian
assailant; the soldier is being investigated for murder and some NGOs have
called for a war crimes prosecution.137 There is no indication that the person
who filmed the incident generally acts as a journalist, for pay or otherwise, but
the impact of his or her video demonstrates how a random passerby can record
and publicize important international incidents in a way that resembles a
journalistic function.
Al-Mousa, in his work for RBSS, would likely be considered a journalist
under the definition adopted by the Human Rights Committee or the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. Defining who
counts as a journalist-or what counts as journalism-is far more complicated
than placing a dividing line somewhere between Athar's tweets and al-Mousa's
work. For example, one might wonder whether human rights NGOs count. One
media sociologist has noted that their function is increasingly journalistic.1 38
An international humanitarian law historian, discussing human rights NGOs
role in reporting from conflict zones, has suggested that their product is
"[m]ore reliably truth-telling" than some modem media journalism. 39 What
about when NGOs promote citizen documentation of abuses? B'Tselern, an
Israeli NGO, distributes video cameras to Palestinians. According to its
website, citizen footage is often broadcast by more traditional media, exposing
incidents that were previously concealed, which can then be used in criminal
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 1 26, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/20/22 (Apr. 10, 2012) (quoting Council of Europe, recommendation No. R (2000) 7 of the
Committee of Ministers to member States on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of
information, adopted on 8 March 2000) (some internal marks omitted).
136. Heyns & Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 307. Heyns is the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions who authored the report discussed supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
137. Peter Beaumont, Israeli Soldier Is Filmed Shooting Dead Wounded Palestinian Attacker,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/24/israeli-soldier-filmed-shoot
-dead-wounded-palestinian-attacker-hebron.
138. Matthew Powers, Contemporary NGO-Journalist Relations. Reviewing and Evaluating an
Emergent Area ofResearch, 9 SOc. COMPASS 427 (2015).
139. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 383 (1994).
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complaints.1 40 The project was given a Special Award at the British One World
Media Awards in the field of citizen journalism.1 41
To be sure, even if he was not a journalist, al-Mousa was a civilian (as is
the random bystander who records an event on her phone). Civilians are
entitled to myriad IHL protections, of course, and one way of reading Article
79 would not add anything to those protections. Nevertheless, Article 79's
history acknowledges that journalists, for public benefit, often run towards
what others runfrom. This is an apt description of what al-Mousa did and what
his RBSS colleagues continue to do. Indeed, for this reason, many government
experts at the ICRC conferences advocated for greater protections for
journalists than other civilians. 142 While Article 79's text does not readily grant
these protections, it does grant to journalists some benefits to which other
civilians are not entitled, precisely because journalists are more likely to find
themselves in dangerous situations.1 43 For example, Article 79 requires states to
issue and recognize identification cards for journalists.144 Recent articles have
put forth suggestions for how to expand protections for journalists, including
further promulgation of official identity cards. 145 These suggestions are
welcome, important, and useful, but are only half the battle. A citizen journalist
who resembles a New York Times reporter in everything but pay grade could
not benefit from these protections.
The stakes of how to define a journalist are even more apparent if one
takes seriously the argument that journalists should be entitled to greater access
during wartime, or if one takes seriously the suggestions others have made
about how to protect journalists. " As the nature of wartime reporting changes,
IHL protections should be read in a manner that encompasses citizen
journalists. Such a reading would accord with the ICRC's mandate to develop
IHL to comport with realities on the ground.147 Either way, whether one is
inclined to read into IHL a protection for journalism or whether one desires
implementation of the existing proposals to make protections for journalists
more effective, determining who may benefit is a crucial question. As some
have suggested, "the journalist is no longer defined by his background,
schooling, and salary, but by his practice and contribution to the expanding
body of reliable information about the world . . . ."148 A recognition of this
140. B'Tselem's Camera Project, B'TSELEM, http://www.btselem.org/video/cdp background
(last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
141. Pini Pavel Miretski & Sascha-Dominik Vladimir Oliver Bachmann, The Panopticon of
International Law: B'Tselem 's Camera Project and the Enforcement of International Law in a
Transnational Society, 52 OSGOODEHALLL.J. 235,243 (2014).
142. 1972 Conference Report, supra note 96, 1 3.78 ("Of the experts who spoke on this subject,
the majority were, however, in favour of granting special protection to journalists engaged in dangerous
missions.").
143. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 23, art. 79(3) ("[A journalist] may obtain an identity card
... [which] shall attest to his status as a journalist.").
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Diisterhdft, supra note 4, at 18-20.
146. For example, improved methods for identifying journalists would have to account for who
can benefit from these methods.
147. See supra notes 233-234 and accompanying text.
148. Bregtje van der Haak, Michael Parks & Manuel Castells, The Future of Journalism:
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reality would be useful whether or not one believes IHL should be understood
to protect journalism, but especially so if one holds this belief.
All of this is closely related to the question of objectivity. Recall that the
General Assembly Resolution that helped set in motion the Additional Protocol
I process described the role of journalists as "inform[ing] world public opinion
objectively,"l49 and there was some concern with journalist objectivity among
government experts at the ICRC. Citizen journalism may not always be as
objective as more traditional institutional journalism, but it might nevertheless
serve a crucial public-informing function. There may be a tradeoff in how one
approaches IHL protections for journalism in the social media context. Whether
in the context of press emblems or journalist access, an expansion of who can
benefit from these protections in order to increase the amount of information
available to the public might also decrease objectivity. To be sure, not all
citizen journalism is biased, just as not all institutional journalism is objective.
For better or worse, institutional affiliation might be treated as a heuristic for
objectivity, a benefit that citizen journalists do not enjoy. Nevertheless, as the
B'Tselem camera project demonstrates, the tradeoff between objectivity and
information-generation may be especially relevant to citizen journalism.
Examining such questions through a lens that acknowledges IHL protection of
journalists' public-informing function can help clarify the tradeoff at stake.
B. Limiting Journalist Access
Beyond the question of who benefits from IHL's protections for
journalists, there are questions of how they benefit. If IHL is indeed properly
understood to protect journalism, there might be implications for journalists'
access. The reaction to the Pentagon's law of war manual demonstrates just one
instance in which the issue of journalist access has generated controversy. so
During its 2006 war with Lebanon, the Israeli military prevented journalists
from accessing certain areas in southern Lebanon.' 5 1 Likewise, both Israel and
Hamas have limited journalist access to certain parts of Gaza during conflict in
the region.1 52 Israel has justified such blockades by citing an inability to
guarantee the safety of journalists.153 In each instance, civil society groups and
Networked Journalism, 6 INT'L J. COMM. 2923, 2926 (2013).
149. G.A. Res. 2673 (XXV), supra note 90 (emphasis added).
150. See supra notes 13-13.
151. Press Release, Int'l Fed'n of Journalists, IFJ Condemns Israeli Restrictions on
Journalist Access to Conflict Zones, (Aug. 9, 2006), http://english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=6cvRT8a8036
602332a6cvRT8.
152. William Booth, Palestinians Curb Israeli Reporters'Access to West Bank, WASH. POST, May
15, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/palestinians-curb-israeli-reporters-access-to-occupied
-territories/2013/05/15/b26da86e-bd7c-lle2-b537-ab47f0325f7c_story.html; Journalists in Israel, West
Bank, and Gaza Face Tightening Restrictions on Access, GLOBAL JOURNALIST, May 23, 2013,
http://globaljoumalist.jour.missouri.edu/freepresswatch/2013/05/israel/joumalists-in-israel-west-bank
-and-gaza-face-tightening-restrictions-on-access. In the instance of Israel blocking access to Gaza, the
Foreign Press Association prevailed in a lawsuit before the Israeli Supreme Court. Nevertheless, Israeli
maintained tight control over which journalists could enter. See Toni O'Loughlin, Israel To Allow Small
Number of Foreign Journalists into Gaza, GUARDIAN, Jan. 2, 2009,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/02/israel-gaza-media-access.
153. See, e.g., O'Loughlin, supra note 151.
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media outlets have objected.
There are several competing issues at hand. On the one side, there is the
journalists' ability to perform their duty. On the other is the state's right to
exercise a certain amount of discretion in limiting access both for journalist
safety and because of military necessity. The Human Rights Commission's
initial draft convention recognized that the military has some authority to
circumscribe journalist movement, at the very least to protect their own safety:
"Possession of a [proposed journalists ID] card . . . implies that the journalist to
whom the card is issued shall . . . not . . . interfere in the domestic affairs of
States to which he proceeds, and not to engage in any activities which may
involve a direct or indirect participation in the conduct of hostilities in the area
where the dangerous mission is being undertaken."l54 At the Conference, some
government experts "stressed that the Draft International Convention should
define better the obligation on journalists to conform to the instructions of the
military authorities .... ."155
This issue is closely related to international human rights law. Article 19
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees
that "[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice."1 56
The same article allows the state to subject this right "to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary: . . . For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals."l 57 The Human Rights Committee has
announced that, as a general matter, Article 19 prohibits states from restricting
journalists' freedom of movement, including to areas affected by conflict. 58
The text of the Human Rights Committee comment suggests that it is directed
at a state's behavior within its own territory. As noted, it is debated when, if
ever, a state exercises sufficient control in foreign territory for the ICCPR to
apply extraterritorially (let alone whether the ICCPR ever applies in
wartime).' 59 In this regard, it is important to distinguish between human rights
law and IHL on the issue of journalist access. If indeed IHIL can be read to
protect journalism, as this Note suggests, then reading a principle of journalistic
access into IHL would not necessarily be redundant vis-A-vis human rights law.
The current Commentary to Additional Protocol I indicates that "[n]either
the right to seek information nor the right to obtain information are at issue" in
Article 79.16 Needless to say, this presents a problem for the argument that
154. The Commission on Human Rights, Draft Articles of the International Convention on the
Protection of Journalists Engaged In Dangerous Proffessional (sic) Missions in Areas of Armed
Conflict, art. 13, reprinted in 1972 Conference Report, supra note 96, at 138.
155. 1972 Conference Report, supra note 96, at 13.89.
156. ICCPR, supra note 42, art. 19(2). Article 19 is a derogable right. Id. art. 4.
157. Id. art. 19(3)(b).
158. General Comment 34, supra note 49, at ¶ 45.
159. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
160. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 918.
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IHL guarantees some right of access. Nevertheless, like other treaties,
Additional Protocol I must be read in light of its object and purpose.161 The
preceding section demonstrated the extent to which Additional Protocol I's
protection of journalists reflected an appreciation of their public-informing role,
especially as it pertains to preventing and punishing war crimes. Subsequent
evidence further confirms this. A purposive read of Additional Protocol I that
acknowledges a protection of journalism might then have implications for
issues of access, even if these are not explicitly found in Article 79. To the
extent that one understands IHL as acknowledging, if not explicitly protecting,
journalists' public-informing role, there is good reason to be skeptical of
circumscription of access. If nothing else, the reaction to the Pentagon's law of
war manual and recent limitations of access demonstrate that this debate is
currently ongoing and would benefit from a clearer articulation of the public-
informing function that IHL seeks to protect.
C. Distinction
The question of distinction and the legitimate targeting of journalism is
closely related to the question of what counts as journalism. Additional
Protocol I extends protections to journalists as civilians "provided that they
take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians."l 62 This brings to
bear the question of when journalists and journalistic infrastructure become
legitimate military targets through direct participation in hostilities.1 63
The Commentary to Additional Protocol I defines "direct participation of
hostilities" as "acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause
actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces"' to
suggest that "[t]he fact that a journalist engages in propaganda cannot be
considered as direct participation."l 65
State practice has in the past strayed from this view, largely evident in the
context of media infrastructure. Media infrastructure is protected by a separate
provision of Additional Protocol I, but the intricacies of the targeting question
have important parallels. Additional Protocol I's Article 52 prohibits wartime
attacks on civilian objects, while permitting certain attacks on military objects.
161. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
162. Additional Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 79(2).
163. There are at least three potential statuses implicated by this question: "journalist,"
"civilian," and "civilian directly participating in hostilities." Only the third category is a legitimate
military target in IHL. See generally Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS (2009),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf (interpreting which kinds of conduct by
civilians constitute direct participation in hostilities). In other words, a journalist does not become a
legitimate military target simply because she is stripped of, or never granted, "journalist" status. Indeed,
the substantive protections are ostensibly unchanged.
164. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 619.
165. 2 HOw DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? PART II: CASES AND DOCUMENTS 590 (Marco
Sass6li et al. eds., 3d ed. 2011); cf Dfisterhoft, supra note 4, at 13 ("Concerning propaganda, it appears
that it can generally not amount to direct participation, warranting attacks on or arrests of journalists.");
Heyns & Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 325 ("The spreading of propaganda for the enemy in itself does not
make a journalist a legitimate target . .. ").
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Its relevant portion reads:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage. 6 6
A seminal example of the difficult contours of Article 52 is NATO's
bombing of the Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) headquarters during its 1999
Kosovo campaign. RTS was a state-owned entity that broadcast across several
radio and television frequencies. At least one of these frequencies was used
for military purposes, broadcasting military orders. NATO claimed that the
RTS facilities, including a large, multi-purpose satellite antenna, were used "as
radio relay stations and transmitters to support the activities of the [Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia] military and special police forces, and therefore they
represent legitimate military targets."168 At the same time, the RTS facilities
were used for civilian broadcasts across both television and radio media. To be
sure, these civilian broadcasts were very much under state control and the
civilian broadcasts perpetuated propaganda. There was no contention that
RTS's civilian broadcasts played a role similar to, for example, certain
Rwandan radio stations during that country's genocide; it did not encourage its
listeners to take genocidal actions, though it did engender support for
Milosevic's regime.169 In striking RTS, NATO officials highlighted this
propaganda role, saying that "[s]trikes against TV transmitters and broadcast
facilities are part of our campaign to dismantle the FRY propaganda machinery
which is a vital part of President Milosevic's control mechanism." 170 Prior to
the attack, NATO suggested that RTS presented a legitimate target because of
its propaganda role and suggested it could absolve itself by providing equal
time for Western broadcasts.171 In assessing these arguments, a committee
advising the Special Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noted that "[w]hile stopping such propaganda may
serve to demoralize the Yugoslav population and undermine the government's
political support, it is unlikely that either of these purposes would offer the
'concrete and direct' military advantage necessary to make them a legitimate
military objective."l72 At the same time, it recommended against charges. The
Department of Defense's law of war manual now cites the special committee's
report for the proposition that "[i]f [the media] is merely disseminating
166. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 23, art. 52(2).
167. INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO THE
PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED To REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TT 71-75 (2000) [hereinafter NATO BOMBING REPORT].
168. Id. 173.
169. Id. 1147,72.
170. Id. 174 (quoting NATO spokesman).
171. Id. (quoting NATO statement: "If President Milosevic would provide equal time for
Western news broadcasts in its programmes without censorship 3 hours a day between noon and 1800
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propaganda to generate support for the war effort, it is not a legitimate target"
and makes clear that independent journalists-including those engaged in
public advocacy-are not subject to attack. 173 This suggests greater
convergence between academics, interpretive bodies, and states with regards to
the legal standards of media targeting.
Media that incites crimes is considered a legitimate target, per the ICTY
committee's report,1 74 the Department of Defense's law of War manual, 7 5 and
several academic commentaries. 176 But what about journalists who
encourage-explicitly or implicitly-participation in hostilities without
themselves participating? The ICRC's Interpretive Guidelines suggest that
"war-sustaining" activities such as recruiting and propaganda are, if anything,
"indirect" participation in hostilities and thus not targetable,1 77 though they also
note "both the general war effort and war-sustaining activities may ultimately
result in harm reaching the threshold required for a qualification as direct
participation in hostilities." 78 Likewise, while the report on the RTS bombing
suggested that propaganda output is not a sufficient reason to target media
infrastructure, it also suggested that "[i]f the media is the nerve system that
keeps a war-monger in power and thus perpetuates the war effort, it may fall
within the definition of a legitimate military objective." 79
Notwithstanding some agreement on the relevant legal standards, the
application of these standards still might suffer from dissonance, as there have
been instances in which states have unapologetically targeted journalists. In its
Libyan campaign, NATO bombed the Al-Jamahiriya, the state television
station, on the grounds that it "was clearly used, not only to disseminate [a]
message of propaganda or hated [sic], but specifically used to incite acts of
violence." 80 While NATO defended the bombing, some NGOs and non-NATO
states expressed concern and even called for an investigation.is8 After an Israeli
strike on a car carrying journalists working for a Hamas-run television station,
an Israeli Defense Forces spokesman noted that "[t]he targets [were] people
who have relevance to terror activity."l82 The U.S. Department of Defense's
law of war manual sparked significant controversy when it noted that, under
some circumstances, journalists might be "unprivileged belligerents," and that
"the relaying of information (such as providing information of immediate use
173. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 7, § 5.9.3.2 n.241, at 229 (quoting NATO
Bombing Report, supra note 167, 147).
174. Id. 1 47; cf U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General to the Security Council
on the Protection ofCivilians in Armed Conflict, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. No. S/1999/957 (Sept. 8, 1999) ("I
recommend that the Security Council . . . [i]n situations of ongoing conflict, ensure that, whenever
required, appropriate measures are adopted to control or close down hate media assets.").
175. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 7, § 5.9.3.2 n.241, at 229.
176. See, e.g., 2 How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, supra note 165, at 593; Dtisterhdft, supra
note 4, at 13.
177. See MELZER, supra note 163, at 51-55.
178. Id. at 52.
179. NATO BOMBING REPORT, supra note 167, ¶ 55.
180. BURRI, supra note 5, at 301 (quoting NATO press briefing).
181. Id.
182. David Carr, Using War as Cover to Target Journalists, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/business/media/using-war-as-cover-to-target-joumalists.html.
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in combat operations) could constitute taking a direct part in hostilities."' 83
State practice demonstrates that these legal standards are hardly
exemplars of clarity. Moreover, their application is complicated by the rise of
social media. Consider recent responses to the rise of social media usage by
ISIS and its supporters. The Iraqi government ordered Internet service
providers to block Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in an attempt to fight ISIS
recruitment and propaganda and prepared a directive to shut down all Internet
access in five provinces.' Western governments, too, have pressured social
media platforns to suspend accounts sympathetic to ISIS, which some have
questioned. In the past, Twitter has removed accounts belonging to other
groups, including al-Shabaab, the Islamic Jihad Union, the Indian Mujahideen,
and al-Qaida.'8 To be sure, these examples are not perfect parallels in two
important ways. First, there is an obvious and important distinction between
suspending Internet access and targeting with military weaponry. Second,
Twitter is a private entity with its own rules and guidelines (though the Iraqi
government is, of course, not private). Nevertheless, it is clear that U.S.
government officials supported and encouraged Twitter's actions. In viewing
such shutdowns through an IHL lens, is there a legal distinction to be made
between a citizen (or professional) journalist's tweet that reads "Thousands of
people protesting the enemy army!" and one that reads "Thousands of people
protesting the enemy army! Come join us!"? What if the tweet says "Citizens
should take up arms and join the fight against the enemy, provided they follow
the laws of war!"? The upshot here is simply to point out that, as the ICRC's
Interpretative Guidelines intimate, the precise contours of where "war-
sustaining" recruitment and propaganda ends and where "participation in
hostilities" begins have yet to be settled, especially in the social media context.
Likewise, it is not easy to determine the line between "merely disseminating
propaganda to generate support for the war effort" and being "the nerve system
that keeps a war-monger in power," to borrow the language of the ICTY
Special Prosecutor committee report.
If one takes seriously the notion that IHL protects journalism in addition
to journalists, there might be an inclination to adjust the distinction analysis
accordingly, reflecting the view that, at times, a propagandist or recruiter who
aids one side in battle might also provide an informative purpose. I do not
mean to suggest that, by virtue of having a Twitter account or performing
journalistic functions, combatants can insulate themselves from targeting.
However, when interrogating targeting choices and attempting to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate targets-both persons and infrastructure-
183. The Pentagon's Dangerous Views on the Wartime Press, supra note 12. For a Department
of Defense response, see The Law of War Manual: The Pentagon Responds, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 29, 2015,
11:51 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2015/08/law-war-manual-pentagon-res
ponds-150829095950357.html. For a defense of the Pentagon's position, see, for example, Loomis,
supra note 12.
184. See Jill C. York, Terrorists on Twitter, SLATE (June 25, 2014, 12:07 P.M.),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future tense/2014/06/isis twitter suspended_how-attempts
to silence terrorists online could backfire.htmi.
185. Id.
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there is room to be more demanding or skeptical of decisions that impact
journalism. This is especially relevant in the context of civilian journalists, who
do not have the institutional legitimacy and support of professionals and who
therefore might be more vulnerable to decisions at the margins. Understanding
why IHL protects journalists might help inform the nuances of these distinction
decisions.
D. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is closely related to the principle of
distinction in IHL. Once a military answers the distinction question, it must
employ proportionality analysis to determine whether the collateral civilian
damage of an attack on a legitimate military target is proportional to its military
advantage. If "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof . . . would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated," then it violates IHL.186 In general, the question of what
is "excessive" (and thus not proportional) is not especially well defined.18 The
ICRC Commentary to a related provision describes this standard as "relatively
imprecise and . . . open to a fairly broad margin of judgment."'8 8 The ICRC's
study of customary IHL "does not present a direct rule or standard for
determining what amounts to excessive collateral damage."' 89 A manual by the
Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, written by
experts in IHL, suggests that "[t]he concept of excessiveness is not an absolute
one . . . [but, rather,] measured in light of the military advantage that the
attacker anticipates to attain through the attack."1 90 So, "[i]f the military
advantage anticipated is marginal, the collateral damage expected need not be
substantial in order to be excessive . . . [and c]onversely, extensive collateral
damage may be legally justified by the military value of the target struck,
because of the high military advantage anticipated by the attack."'91 The
majority of scholars seem to agree that excessiveness cannot be precisely
defined.192
Some have suggested that journalists could receive specific status under
IHL.1 93 Currently, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols grant
186. Additional Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 51(5)(b); see also id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
187. See generally Jason D. Wright, "Excessive" Ambiguity: Analysing and Refining the
Proportionality Standard, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 819 (2012); see also Gabriella Blum, On a
Diferential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 163, 189 ("Much has been written on the indeterminacy of
the principle of proportionality and on the unworkable test of comparing the incommensurable values of
military advantage and civilian lives.").
188. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 679.
189. Wright, supra note 187, at 837.
190. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR
AND MISSILE WARFARE 92 (2010).
191. Id.
192. See Wright, supra note 187, at 839-40. For a thoughtful discussion of the issue, see Joshua
Andresen, Challenging the Perplexity Over Jus in Bello Proportionality, 7 EUR. J. LEG. STUD. 19
(2014).
193. See, e.g., Dilsterhaft, supra note 4, at 18; Foster, supra note 4, at 479.
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such status to women, 194 children, 19 medical personnel, 196 civil defense
staff,197 and by implication ICRC delegates and religious personnel.198 Such
status reflects either (or both) the particular vulnerability of the group and/or
the functions they perform.' Likewise, IHL contains special status for certain
infrastructure including, for example, cultural property and religious sites.200
Humanitarian workers and military medical and religious personnel, who
receive special status, fulfill an individual, humanitarian role, while journalists
play a more public-informing role. At least one commentator has noted this
distinction to suggest that "[e]ven though journalists are in fact essential to
armed conflicts, their role in protecting and saving individuals cannot be
compared to that of humanitarian aid personnel." 201 To the extent that one
shares this view, this might militate against granting journalists special status.
At the same time, one might argue that the public-informing role of journalists,
especially to the extent that they serve as crucial early warning systems against
war crimes or crucial means of ex post accountability, is sufficiently important
to warrant such status. 202
Even if such status is created, there might be unanswered questions about
its functional protections. Yoam Dinstein has described existing special statuses
as "merely the icing on the cake: it adds some flavor but it does not really affect
the core." 203
Moreover, the recent Pentagon law of war manual has called into question
the nature of special status protections. The manual notes that "[b]ecause
medical and religious personnel are deemed to have accepted the risk of death
or further injury due to proximity to military operations, they need not be
considered as incidental harm in assessing proportionality in conducting
attacks."204 This portion of the manual has generated significant debate, with
some suggesting that it dangerously upends traditional proportionality rules.205
194. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 15, art. 27; Geneva Convention 111, supra note 15, art.
14; Geneva Convention II, supra note 15, art. 12; Geneva Convention I, supra note 15, art. 12; see also
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 34, at 475-79.
195. Additional Protocol II, supra note 39, art. 4(3)(c); Additional Protocol 1, supra note 23, art.
77(2); see also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 34, at 479-88.
196. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 23, art. 15; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 15, art.
20; Geneva Convention II, supra note 15, art. 36; Geneva Convention I, supra note 15, arts. 24-26; see
also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 34, at 79-86.
197. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 23, art. 61.
198. See Dilsterh6ft, supra note 4, at 18; see also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note
34, at 88-91, 105-09.
199. Yoram Dinstein, Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International Armed
Conflicts, 84 INT'L L. STUD. 183, 188 (2008).
200. Id.
201. Diisterh6ft supra note 4, at 18.
202. Cf Foster, supra note 4, at 479 (arguing for granting to journalists special status comparable
to that which medial personnel receive).
203. Dinstein, supra note 199, at 188.
204. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 7, § 7.8.2.1, at 436.
205 See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, The Law of War Manual's Threat to the Principle of Proportionality,
JUST SECURITY (June 23, 2016, 10:06 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/31631/lowm-threat-principle-
proportionality; Marty Lederman, Troubling Proportionality and Rule-of-Distinction Provisions in the
Law of War Manual, JUST SECURITY (June 27, 2016, 10:57 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/31661
/law-war-manual-distinction-proportionality.
446
The Pen and the Sword
Others have indicated that the manual's position is defensible because it
implicitly refers only to medical and religious personnel who are part of the
armed forces and are thus do not fall neatly into either combatant or civilian
categories. 20
Whether or not journalists gain special status, the manual's underlying
logic might have significant consequence for journalists. The implication of the
manual's logic for journalists depends in large part on whether it stands for
proposition that proportionality analyses can discount any medical and
religious personnel because they knowingly accept risks, or whether it refers
only to those personnel affiliated with militaries. If the latter, there are likely
few implications for journalists. If, however, the manual suggests that any
personnel who knowingly run towards, rather than from, war zones, do not
affect proportionality analyses, the implications for journalists are severe.
Journalists, like medical and religious personnel, accept certain risks and
knowingly enter war zones. In this regard, if state practice begins to reflect the
notion that proportionality need not consider civilians-whether or not they
have special status-who place themselves in danger, journalists would lose
protections in proportionality analyses.
Consequently, a commitment to protecting wartime journalism might at
the very least require a clarification of the Pentagon's position. Moreover, there
may be some room to create a different system for protecting journalists that
grants them special status and commits to providing more that mere "icing on
the cake." 207 An especially aggressive-though surely controversial-system
would tip the balance of the proportionality analysis that states must undertake
when launching attacks. It would not preclude attacks against journalists or
media infrastructure but would require states to factor their special status into
its proportionality analyses; functionally, this means that an action causing
incidental damage against journalists or media infrastructure would have to
confer a greater military advantage than it would under the current regime, in
which journalists and media infrastructure have no special status.
In short, granting such status to journalists would, in instances in which
the military must weight costs and benefits of an attack, increase the weight of
the costs side when journalists might be injured. This system need not be
limited to journalists as individuals. Imagine a hypothetical in which the RTS
headquarters broadcast objective reporting rather than propaganda. Under this
proposed system, were it understood that this qualified it for special
protections, the proportionality analysis would be affected.
It should be noted that, during the history of Article 79, some government
experts expressed concern over any special discussion of journalists for fear
that expanding their protection would implicitly weaken protection for other
civilians.208 In this regard, any attempt to affect the proportionality analysis-
206. See, e.g., John Merriam, Must Military Medical and Religious Personnel Be Accounted for
in a Proportionality Analysis?, JUST SECURITY (July 8, 2016, 10:37 AM),
https://wwwjustsecurity.org/31905/military-medical-religious-personnel-accounted-proportionality
-analysis.
207. See supra note 203.
208. 1972 Conference Report, supra note 96, ¶ 3.76 ("[S]ome experts expressed doubts as to
2016] 447
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 41: 415
whether for journalists relative to other civilians or for journalistic
infrastructure relative to other civilian infrastructure-would be highly
controversial. Nevertheless, it is not a foregone conclusion that expanding the
state's proportionality limitations vis-it-vis journalists and journalistic
infrastructure would necessarily weaken protection for other civilians. There is
no evidence to suggest that the special status for ambulances and medics, for
example, weakens protections for school buses and teachers, and there is no
logical reason why it should. If anything, such special status might be
protective of civilians, as it would limit certain strikes that might kill not just
journalists but other civilians.
E. Internet Shutdown
The preceding discussions of distinction and proportionality bring to bear
a specific concern implicated by protection of journalism. As noted, states have
at times shut down Internet sites, Internet accounts, and, in some instances, the
entire Internet. The use of social media by professional journalists and citizen
journalists alike to transmit news raises questions about total and partial
Internet shutdown.
The RTS bombing is particularly relevant to the issue of Internet
shutdown for several reasons. First, there are clear analogies between the
purposes for which the RTS was used and the purposes for which the Internet is
used. Like the RTS, the Internet can provide both a means of communicating
offensive military orders and a means of presenting propaganda-state-
sponsored or otherwise-that provides a civilian basis of support for the
military army. Moreover, because states still maintain the ability to censor
content in a widespread way, it is certainly possible that the Internet provides a
civilian communications structure that does not provide equal time for all sides.
Rather, there are myriad examples in which dissent is silenced and only pro-
government websites and news sources are accessible to the civilian
populations of certain countries.
To this end, an argument that international humanitarian law protects
journalists' work might be useful as a supporting mechanism for a prohibition
on Internet shutdown. This argument would rely on the notion that the Internet
is a critical tool for journalists-professional journalists and citizen journalists
alike-to disseminate their reporting. Of course, a counterargument would
suggest that journalism existed long before the Internet and that it does not
require the Internet to be effective. A more compelling case may be made by
reference to citizen journalists, who use blogging platforms and social media to
disseminate information from war theatres in unprecedented ways. To the
extent that a protection of journalists' work would extend to citizen journalists,
the necessity of granting special protection to journalists engaged in dangerous missions. In their
opinion, the granting of special protection to an increasing number of categories weakened the general
protection due to the civilian population from which journalists also benefited."); 1971 Conference
Report, supra note 94, ¶ 509 ("Several experts . . . argued that it was not necessary to create another
category of persons to enjoy special protection from the dangers of military operations and that this
would weaken the concept of general protection which applied to all civilians including journalists.").
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an Internet shutdown might be understood to make their work impossible. This
is true in the context of a total shutdown, but would also extend to the more
probable possibility of a partial shutdown of sites such as Twitter, Facebook,
and blogging platforms, and certainly to targeted shutdowns of specific
accounts. Consider, once again, RBSS. If the relevant authorities could
successfully shut down their social media accounts, their work would be
significantly handicapped.
When Syrian President Bashar al-Assad shut down parts of the Internet
during the country's ongoing civil war, human rights groups expressed concern
about what the shutdown meant for the ability to monitor war crimes. Amnesty
International's Middle East and North Africa Deputy Director, for example,
stated:
As fighting intensifies, particularly around Damascus, we are extremely worried
that the news that internet and mobile phone services appear to have been cut
throughout Syria may herald the intention of the Syrian authorities to shield the
truth of what is happening in the country from the outside world.
Once again, we call on all sides to the conflict to make the protection of civilians
their top priority, and to respect international humanitarian law.
It is time to stop war crimes and crimes against humanity, not to commit them
behind a wall of silence. Anyone committing such acts should know that they will
be held accountable in the future.20
This statement reflected a concern about what the Syrian Internet
shutdown meant for the ability to expose war crimes to the outside world. It
provides substantial evidence that, from the perspective of NGOs that monitor
war crimes, some observers are of the opinion that Internet shutdowns are
problematic not just in their own right, but also because of their effect on the
ability to expose the world to the truths of war.
On the distinction front, a mechanism that imposes a higher burden on
labeling professional or citizen journalists as legitimate targets for censorship
would thus impact Internet freedom and make it harder for states to shut down
specific accounts, specific sites, or the entire Internet in some regions. On the
proportionality front, a system that places greater weight on protecting
journalism would make it more difficult for the state to shut down particular
sites or the entire Internet when those entities serve a dual purpose.
IV. MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
The preceding sections have made the case that there has been a shift in
the reasoning underlying wartime legal protection of journalism, and have
considered some possible implications. This section considers some potential
ways of implementing the suggested changes. This list of mechanisms is not
exhaustive: many others have explored ways of making changes to how IHL
protects journalists, though not necessarily through an explicit framework of
protecting journalism.
209. Press Release, Amnesty Intemational, Syria's Internet and Mobile Networks Shutdown is
Alarming Development (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/syrias-intemet-and
-mobile-networks-shutdown-alarming-development.
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A. A New Treaty
Several commentators have suggested development of a new treaty to
govern protections for journalists.2o Likewise, several NGOs have drafted
guidelines or proposed conventions on protections for journalists.211 As others
have noted, there are several ways in which a new treaty could come to fruition.
If focused exclusively on wartime protections, it could operate as an Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions under the guidance of the ICRC. If
focused on general protections that include wartime provisions, the United
Nations might be a more appropriate institutional framework in which to
operate (to be sure, the U.N. could promote a treaty exclusively focused on
IHL).
A new treaty would, of course, be able to explicitly announce protection
for journalism and journalists and clarify the underlying purposes of such
protections. In this regard, it could both cement and build on existing IHL
protections for journalism. It could be a means of clarifying each of the
implications discussed in Part III, among other implications. It might also have
the benefit of clarifying the protections applicable in non-international armed
conflicts. The tradeoff of working from a blank slate is a potential loss of
feasibility; several scholars have expressed doubt that states would sign on to
such a convention.212
B. Interpreting Existing Law
To the extent that one embraces the views espoused in Part I of this Note
(that the purpose underlying protections for journalists reflects a desire to
protect public access to information), a new convention might be superfluous.
Instead, one might be inclined to advocate that the ICRC act aggressively in
reinterpreting existing law. The ICRC has been described as "among the most
unusual of international institutions." 213 The 1949 Geneva Conventions grant
the ICRC a unique role in monitoring compliance and promoting compliance
with IHL. The Statutes of the ICRC, to which states have acceded, reflect the
dual role of the ICRC. They reaffirm that the ICRC is "an independent
humanitarian organization having a status of its own." 214 At the same time, the
Statutes acknowledge the unique role granted to the ICRC by the Geneva
210. See, e.g., Balguy-Gallois, supra note 4, at 67.
211. See, e.g., International Declaration on the Protection of Journalists, INT'L PRESS INST.
(Mar. 20, 2016), http://www.freemedia.at/international-declaration-on-the-protection-of-journalists;
Drqft Proposal for an International Convention to Strengthen the Protection of Journalists in Armed
Conflicts and Other Situations Including Civil Unrest and Targeted Killings, PRESS EMBLEM CAMPAIGN
(Dec., 2007), http://www.pressemblem.ch/4983.html.
212. See, e.g., Davies & Crawford, supra note 4, at 2173 ("The value of the existing laws
should not be underestimated . ... Promotion of these existing laws . . . may well be more constructive
than calling for a new treaty . . . ."); Dilsterhdft supra note 4, at 17 ("It is questionable whether States
would sign and ratify yet another legal instrument . . . .").
213. Rotem Giladi & Steven Ratner, The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 525, 546 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta &
Marco Sass6li eds., 2015).
214. Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, art. 5(1) (1986),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/statutes-en-a5.pdf.
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Conventions, including its mandate "to work for the faithful application of
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to take
cognizance of any complaints based on alleged breaches of that law." 215 The
Statutes also recognize that the ICRC's mandate includes more than monitoring
and compliance-promotion. It includes working with states to "prepare any
216development" in IHLL. A recent meeting of the International Conference of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent, for example, gave the ICRC the mandate to
"strengthen international humanitarian law" through both reaffirming IHL in
situations when it is improperly implemented and through "its clarification or
development when it does not sufficiently meet the needs of the victims of
armed conflict," 2 17 while still acknowledging states' primary role in developing
IHL.
As one commentator has explained, the ICRC's function includes a
"constant reappraisal of humanitarian rules to ensure that they are geared to the
reality of conflict situations, and preparing for their adaptation and
development when necessary."218
In this regard, the ICRC plays an important role in putting forth an
honest, but perhaps forward-leaning, view of IHL in order to comport with state
practice and ensure its efficacy. Functionally, it does this in several ways,
including through private contact with parties to armed conflict. More
publically, the ICRC publishes analyses of the sources of IHL. First, it
interprets the provisions of treaty-based IHL, a process that brings to bear the
role of the Commentary to Additional Protocol I, which contrasts with this
Note's argument. The Commentary to Additional Protocol I is one of several
official International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentaries to the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. While these
Commentaries are highly influential and persuasive, they are not dispositive.219
The Commentaries are an important interpretive tool for these purposes, but are
not chiseled in stone. Indeed, the ICRC is currently updating the Commentaries
to both the original four Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional
Protocols. 220
The first of the new Commentaries has recently been published, and the
ICRC's explanation if its role and methodology is instructive. The ICRC's
stated purpose in the project "is to ensure that the new editions reflect
contemporary practice and legal interpretation . . . . [with] the benefit of ...
years of application of the Conventions . . . and their interpretation by States,
215. Id. art 5(2)(c).
216. Id. art 5(2)(g).
217. 31st Int'l Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Strengthening Legal Protection for
Victims of Armed Conflicts (Jan. 12, 2011), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/resolution/31
-intemational-conference-resolution-1-2011 .htm.
218. Yves Sandoz, The International Committee of the Red Cross as Guardian of International
Humanitarian Law (1998), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm.
219. See supra note 25.
220. Bringing the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols
into the 21st Century, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS (2012), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents
/interview/2012/geneva-conventions-commentaries-interview-2012-07-12.htm (interview with Jean-
Marie Henckaerts, ICRC legal adviser) (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
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courts and scholars." 221
The ICRC notes that it follows the interpretive rules of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties222 (VCLT) in examining contemporary
practice and interpretation. These include the mandate that treaties be
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose."223 The ICRC notes that "the terms 'object and purpose' are used as 'a
combined whole'. Thus, a treaty's object and purpose is said to refer to its
'raison d'6tre', its 'fundamental core', or 'its essential content'." 224 Further, the
ICRC cites Article 31(3) of the VCLT for the mandate to account for:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
225parties.
An application of this methodology to Additional Protocol I might well
lead to the conclusion that IHL protects journalism. The 1987 Commentary
rejects the view that Article 79 reflects anything more than an affirmation of
journalists' civilian status, but the ICRC need not explicitly reject this view in
order to interpret IHL to protect journalism. There is little doubt that the "object
and purpose," "raison d'8tre" and "fundamental core" of Additional Protocol I
was to strengthen protections for civilians in wartime. As this Note has shown,
there is ample evidence to suggest that the motivation behind expanding
protections for journalists was not only to affirm their status as civilians.
Rather, states were also motivated to protect journalists because they
understood journalism as playing a critical role in informing the world when the
wartime rights of civilians were violated. Protecting journalists was not only an
end in itself, but also a means to another end: the effective application of the
IHL system.
In terms of subsequent "application of the Conventions . . . and their
interpretation by States, courts and scholars," 226 the evidence is something of a
mixed bag. The underlying legal standards of when media entities-both
individuals and infrastructure-are targetable appear to be moving towards
some consensus even if, in practice, the application of these standards is
somewhat disputed. While it may not always be clear when media crosses the
line from propaganda to incitement, for example, it is clearer that curbing
propaganda does not constitute sufficient military advantage to justify
targeting. The ICRC and others must acknowledge the consequences of
dissonance in application and treat them with appropriate nuance. Nevertheless,
221. See ICRC 2016 Commentary, supra note 25, ¶ 5.
222. VCLT, supra note 161.
223. ICRC 2016 Commentary, supra note 25 (quoting VCLT, art. 31(1)).
224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting VCLT art. 31(3)).
226. ICRC 2016 Commentary, supra note 25, 1 5; see also supra note 221 and accompanying
text.
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the uncertain application of the legal standards should not be viewed as a
deterrent to ICRC articulation of the broader principle; instead it should be an
invitation for articulating underlying principles and clarifying the applicable
standards.
On a more general level, the ICRC methodology embraces the ICJ's
mandate that "an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied
within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the
interpretation." 227 To be sure, this is not carte blanche to impose international
human rights law doctrine on IHL. Indeed, the ICRC makes clear that the
complicated relationship between IHL and human rights law requires nuanced
treatment. Nevertheless, as the preceding discussion has shown, the decision to
adopt Additional Protocol I and expand IHL protections for civilians was at
least partially inspired by the rise of human rights law. In this regard, while the
ICRC cannot read human rights law into IHL, it must read IHL against the
backdrop of human rights law. Thus, even if the ICCPR may not apply in
wartime, the broader understanding that journalists play a critical role in
guaranteeing principles of humanity and identifying violations of human rights
law and humanitarian law is relevant to understanding Additional Protocol I as
a whole.
The ICRC will soon publish an updated Commentary on Additional
Protocol I, based on this methodology. Whether or not the Commentary reflects
an understanding that IHL protects journalism in addition to journalists, the
ICRC should continue its interpretative process and embrace the dual purposes
of protecting journalists.
In addition to interpreting IHL treaties, the ICRC publishes and promotes
interpretations of customary IHL.228 Customary IHL is distinct from treaty-
based IHL, but it has the same force of law as treaty-based law. Customary IHL
forms from "a general practice accepted as law" 229 and has two requisite
components. First, for a rule to rise to the level of customary IHL, it must be
reflected in state practice. Second, that state practice must come from a sense of
opinio juris-in other words, that it is legally required, rather than simply
prudent or politically expedient.230 Some have accused the ICRC of blurring the
line between lex lata (the law as it exists) and lexferenda (the law as it should
be) in its interpretation of customary IHL.231 Indeed, in response to the most
recent compendium of customary IHL, the U.S. Department of State's Legal
Adviser and the Department of Defense's General Counsel jointly authored a
response raising concerns.232 I highlight this response not as an accusation or
227. ICRC 2016 Commentary, supra note 25, T 36 (quoting Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 53 (June 21)).
228. See generally HENCKAERTS & DOsWALD-BECK, supra note 34.
229. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
230. See Introduction to HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 34, at xxxvii-xxxviii.
231. See, e.g., J. Jeremy Marsh, Lex Lata or Lex Ferenda? Rule 45 of the ICRC Study on
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 198 MIL. L. REv. 116 (2008).
232. John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the
International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT'L.
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defense of the ICRC; rather, I raise it to make the relatively modest point that,
at times, the ICRC has been assertive in fulfilling its mandate to "develop"
IHL.
The ICRC must, of course, be judicious in its actions to protect its unique
role and ensure its ability to protect its mandate. Consequently, it could not
impose upon states every implication discussed in Part II. The notion that states
must afford journalists special status in proportionality analyses is likely too
extreme to constitute lex lata, whether or not one thinks it is lex ferenda.
Nevertheless, the ICRC does have room to acknowledge the notion that public
access to wartime information was a driving force behind Additional Protocol I
and remains an important value in international discussion on improving
protections for journalists and media infrastructure. It can engage in purposive
interpretation to clarify, publically or privately, its opinions on proportionality
and distinction in the media context, for example. In the proportionality
context, the ICRC can clarify what constitutes excessive collateral damage in
the context of media personnel and infrastructure that serve a public purpose. In
the distinction context, as noted, the lines between journalistic function, war-
sustaining activities, and participation in hostilities are not especially sharply
drawn. State practice has at times made this reality abundantly clear. The ICRC
certainly has a role to play in better defining these contours.
Greater definition of these contours is especially important with regard to
citizen journalists. The ICRC sometimes plays what has been called a
"catalyst" function. When existing legal frameworks are insufficient, the ICRC
seeks to go beyond "simply . . . tak[ing] note of problems of application of
international humanitarian law" and works to ensure that "those concerned
must be encouraged to think about ways of dealing with them."233 As one
scholar has explained:
When a real problem crops up on the ground it is not enough to say that it cannot be
resolved by revising the law. It is essential to go a step further and seek possible
remedies, not-and this is important-in isolation, but drawing on the widest
possible range of expert knowledge and experience. In short, international
humanitarian law must be transformed into a dynamic force so that it can better
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serve the interests of those it is designed to assist and protect.
The ICRC regularly meets with government officials in an iterative
process to help define, implement, and advance IHL. It would be wise for some
of these meetings to include media experts who could contribute to the dialogue
and help define and expand precisely whom Article 79 protects. Relatedly, it
should make efforts to encourage states that issue press credentials to consider
expanding the type of journalist to whom such credentials are issued. This work
is especially important in light of suggestions that have been made to grant
journalists special emblems to better identify them as civilians. To the extent
that such emblems would assist states in making targeting decisions or
otherwise protect journalists (a notion some have questioned), for example, it is
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crucial that these emblems are made available to all who qualify as journalists,
and not only to those with institutional support from major news outlets.
C. A System ofNotification and Derogation235
One possible mechanism for developing the law and practice of
protecting journalism in wartime would be the creation of a system of
notification and derogation. Such a system would be especially relevant when
states attempt to block journalist access or shut down specific Internet sites.
In short, a system of notification and derogation would be based on
similar systems in human rights treaties. Many human rights treaties have
derogation clauses, which-under certain circumstances-permit states to
derogate from some of the protections guaranteed by the treaties. The ICCPR,
for example, "[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation," allows states to "take measures derogating from their obligations under
the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation."236 When a state derogates, it must notify other ICCPR signatories
through the U.N. Secretary-General and provide clear justification for the
derogation.237 While not all rights in the ICCPR are derogable,238 Article 19,
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which protects free expression, access to information, and press, is
derogable.
A similar system could be used in the IHL context, especially when states
limit journalist access to certain sites or attempt to shut down the Internet,
certain websites, or certain social media accounts. Under such a system,
blocking journalist access would be acceptable, but only in times of true
necessity, and the limitation of access would be registered to an international
body such as a U.N. outfit, or an NGO such as the ICRC. This system could be
made obligatory in a treaty but could also simply operate on a voluntary basis.
Such a system would allow states to limit access for journalists' own safety and
for military necessity and expediency but would still respect wartime protection
of journalism by mirroring the derogation processes of international human
rights law. It would have at least two clear desirable benefits from the
perspective of protecting journalist access. First, it would force states to justify
blocking access or total or partial Internet shutdown and to define the military
expediency that ostensibly excused it. Ex ante, this process might make states
less likely to block access or take shutdown action in an arbitrary manner.
Second, this justification, when blocked access or shutdown occurs, would help
develop the law by allowing for an ex post assessment of the validity of the
shutdown. This ex post assessment would help adjudicatory bodies define the
contours of the treaty-based law and help develop state practice that informs
235. This system would complement and supplement the process that exists under the ICCPR.
As discussed supra notes 40-50, not all states recognize the ICCPR's applicability in wartime and even
those that do are not bound in situations where they lack effective control over the territory.
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239. Id. art. 19. Indeed, Article 19 has a caveat written into it, allowing certain restrictions
"[f]or the protection of national security or of public order," but only as "necessary." Id. at 19(3).
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customary IHL.
It would allow the relevant body to conduct an ex post examination of the
decision and help develop the law governing wartime journalist access by
articulating standards during which such access may be justifiably limited and
studying specific factual scenarios to give depth to these standards. Such a
system would also require states to enunciate the reasons for preventing
journalist access, thus helping develop state practice, which, in turn, informs
customary IHL.
Such a system would be more state-friendly than some alternatives of
ensuring journalistic access. Perhaps the most journalism-friendly means of
doing so is to require militaries to inform journalists of potential dangers but
prevent them from blocking access. Under such a system, it would be
incumbent on the military to describe in the greatest detail possible why it is
dangerous to access a specific location, but it would be left to the journalist's
discretion whether to heed the warning. Portions of the initial Human Rights
Commission draft convention reflect this view. It made incumbent on the state
the responsibility to "[i]nform [the journalist] to the extent compatible with
military requirements of the areas and circumstances in which he may be
exposed to danger."240 Moreover, it stated that "[w]hen undertaking dangerous
professional missions in an area where there is a conflict . . . journalists have
the right to protection from an immediate danger resulting from hostilities only
to the extent that they shall not expose themselves to danger without needing to
do so for professional reasons." 24' This might imply that, when journalists feel
the need to do so for professional reasons, they have the right to expose
themselves to danger without losing protection. Given the international
pressure that some states have received when blocking journalist access, they
might have an incentive to participate in the relatively more state-friendly
derogation system.
CONCLUSION
This Note has presented an analysis of the purposes underlying the
expansion of IHL protections for wartime journalists. It has argued that those
purposes were twofold. As others have noted, past expansions of IHL
protections for journalists reflected what this Note has called individual
humanitarianism: a desire to protect journalists from harm due to their status as
civilians. But, as this Note has shown, the expansion of IHL protections for
journalists also reflected a desire to protect their unique, public-informing
function. In this regard, the expansion was both an end in itself and a means of
achieving another end: the protection of other civilians through a spotlight on
wartime actions. Consequently, this Note has argued, IHL is most appropriately
understood as protecting journalism in addition to journalists.
As this Note has highlighted, the notion that IHL protects journalism has
consequences for elements of both lex lata and lexferenda. Tradeoffs inhere in
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each of these elements, but viewing IHL's protections of journalists through a
lens that emphasizes their public-informing role helps clarify the relative value
of each side of these tradeoffs. Indeed, it helps explain the reaction to the
Department of Defense's recent law of war manual as well as the reaction to
recent efforts at censorship and blocked access. Such issues are unlikely to
diminish in frequency or importance. As states, scholars, international
institutions, the ICRC, and other NGOs consider how to apply IHL to such
scenarios, they should acknowledge that both journalists and journalism are
protected.

